United States of America v. Frank Wayne Reinke

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
FRANK WAYNE REINKE,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 17-30025
D.C. No.
1:15-cr-00031-SPW-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Susan P. Watters, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 7, 2018**
Seattle, Washington
Before: RAWLINSON, CLIFTON, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Franke Wayne Reinke appeals his conviction of firearm possession in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 922(j). We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
FILED
MAR 09 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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The district court did not err by denying Reinke’s motion to suppress
evidence seized from two police searches of his vehicle.
Deputy Lester had reasonable suspicion to stop Reinke for driving under the
influence. “An investigatory stop of a vehicle is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment if the officer reasonably suspects that a traffic violation has occurred.”
United States v. Miranda-Guerena, 445 F.3d 1233, 1236 (9th Cir. 2006). Deputy
Lester observed Reinke driving in the middle of two lanes ten miles under the
speed limit despite the absence of other vehicles.
Reinke’s traffic stop was not prolonged by a K-9 search. An officer “may
conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop,” as long
as he does not unreasonably prolong the stop. Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S.
Ct. 1609, 1615 (2015). Deputy Lester did not unreasonably prolong the stop. He
requested a K-9 search as he went to his vehicle to write Reinke’s citation, and the
K-9 search was completed before Deputy Lester gave Reinke’s passenger a
citation.
The probation officers had reasonable suspicion to search Reinke’s truck.
As a condition of his parole, Reinke agreed to allow a probation officer to search
his person, vehicle, or residence without a warrant if the officer had reasonable
suspicion that Reinke violated the conditions of his parole or was engaged in
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criminal activity. Officers Clark and Zent had many reasons to suspect that Reinke
was engaged in criminal activity. The officers were aware that the police had a
warrant out for Reinke’s arrest before they visited Reinke’s camper. Once they
arrived, Reinke padlocked his camper in violation of his parole, fled the scene on
foot and gave cause for suspicion. See United States v. Smith, 633 F.3d 889, 893
(9th Cir. 2011). The officer recognized the orange truck as one that Reinke often
drove, and saw two bottles of alcohol, one half-empty, through the truck’s opened
door. This indicated that Reinke had violated yet another condition of his parole
by consuming alcohol. Upon reporting the incident to the police, the probation
officers were informed that Reinke was known to have firearms in the bed of his
truck.
AFFIRMED.
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