Nhuong Van Nguyen v. Jackson Lucky;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
NHUONG VAN NGUYEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JACKSON LUCKY; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 17-56701
D.C. No. 5:17-cv-01752-JGB-KK
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Jesus G. Bernal, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 11, 2018**
Before: SILVERMAN, PAEZ, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Nhuong Van Nguyen appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his action arising from a state court family law action. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s
dismissal under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
APR 16 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 17-56701
(9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Nguyen’s action as barred by the
Rooker–Feldman doctrine because the complaint attacks a determination in
Nguyen’s prior state court case. See id. at 1155-57 (Rooker–Feldman doctrine bars
de facto appeals of a state court decision). Contrary to Nguyen’s contention that he
has alleged “fraud upon the court,” the district court properly concluded that
Nguyen did not allege facts showing that an adverse party committed an extrinsic
fraud on the state court. See Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1140-41
(9th Cir. 2004) (defining extrinsic fraud, and recognizing that the Rooker–Feldman
doctrine does not apply if extrinsic fraud prevented a party from presenting his or
her claim in state court).
AFFIRMED.

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