Sherman Terrell Pruitt v. CHARLES L. RYAN, Warden, Director at Arizona Department of Corrections;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SHERMAN TERRELL PRUITT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CHARLES L. RYAN, Warden, Director at
Arizona Department of Corrections; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 17-15451
D.C. No. 2:13-cv-02357-DJH
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Diane J. Humetewa, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 11, 2018**
Before: SILVERMAN, PAEZ, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Sherman Terrell Pruitt, an Arizona state prisoner, appeals pro se from the
district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
APR 17 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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(9th Cir. 2004), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Pruitt failed
to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants were
deliberately indifferent in the treatment of Pruitt’s rectal pain, prostate pain, and
skin conditions. See id. at 1057-60 (deliberate indifference is a high legal standard;
medical malpractice, negligence, or a difference of opinion concerning the course
of treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference); Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d
1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (delay in providing medical treatment does not
constitute Eighth Amendment violation unless delay was harmful).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in disregarding Pruitt’s
unauthorized filings. See D. Ariz. Loc. R. 7.2; Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d
1118, 1129 (9th Cir. 2002) (broad deference is given to a district court’s
management of litigation and interpretation of its local rules); Hinton v. Pac.
Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Pruitt’s motion to
appoint an expert witness because Pruitt failed to show that appointment of an
expert was necessary. See Walker v. Am. Home Shield Long Term Disability
Plan, 180 F.3d 1065, 1071 (9th Cir. 1999) (setting forth standard of review).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Pruitt’s motion for
appointment of counsel because Pruitt failed to demonstrate exceptional

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circumstances. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting
forth standard of review and requirement of “exceptional circumstances” for
appointment of counsel).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.

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