Glenn Galvan, pro se v. MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., AKA MERS, AKA MERSCORP Holdings, Inc.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GLENN GALVAN, pro se,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., AKA
MERS, AKA MERSCORP Holdings, Inc.;
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST
COMPANY,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 17-16930
D.C. No. 3:15-cv-00632-MMD-
VPC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Miranda M. Du, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 15, 2018**
Before: SILVERMAN, BEA, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
Glenn Galvan appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in
his diversity action arising from foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAY 23 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 17-16930
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Garity v. APWU Nat’l Labor Org.,
828 F.3d 848, 854 (9th Cir. 2016) (issue preclusion); Ford v. City of Yakima, 706
F.3d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 2013) (cross-motions for summary judgment). We
affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants on the
basis of issue preclusion because the issue of whether the assignment of the loan
was fraudulent was actually litigated and decided against Galvan in his prior
action. See Five Star Capital Corp. v. Ruby, 194 P.3d 709, 713-14 (Nev. 2008) (en
banc) (elements of issue preclusion under Nevada law).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Galvan’s requests
for judicial notice. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689-90 (9th Cir.
2001) (setting forth standard of review and circumstances under which judicial
notice is inappropriate).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Galvan’s discovery
requests because Galvan failed to demonstrate how the denial resulted in actual
and substantial prejudice to him. See Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 342 F.3d
1080, 1085, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting forth standard of review and explaining
that district court’s decision to deny discovery will not be disturbed unless there is
a clear showing that the denial “results in actual and substantial prejudice” (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)).

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3 17-16930
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Galvan’s motion to
stay. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706-07 (1997) (setting forth standard of
review and explaining that district court “has broad discretion to stay proceedings
as an incident to its power to control its own docket”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Galvan leave to
amend because amendment would have been futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide
Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of
review and stating that leave to amend may be denied where amendment would be
futile).
To the extent that Galvan seeks review of orders from his state court
proceedings, we do not consider those orders as they are not properly before this
court.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.

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