Faron E. Lovelace v. Robin Sandy;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
FARON E. LOVELACE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ROBIN SANDY; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 17-35499
D.C. No. 1:14-cv-00430-BLW
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
Chief Judge B. Lynn Winmill, Presiding
Submitted May 15, 2018**
Before: SILVERMAN, BEA, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
Idaho state prisoner Faron E. Lovelace appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional
and state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 892
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAY 23 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 17-35499
(9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Lovelace’s action because Lovelace
failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. See Hebbe v.
Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are to be
liberally construed, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a
plausible claim for relief); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995)
(states may create liberty interests protected by due process, but such interests are
limited to “freedom from restraint” which “imposes atypical and significant
hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”);
Lightner v. Hardison, 239 P.3d 817, 823-24 (Idaho Ct. App. 2010) (analyzing
Idaho Department of Correction visiting policy and concluding that termination of
visiting privileges does not impose an atypical and significant hardship).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appointment of
counsel because Lovelace failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances. See
Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting forth standard of
review and requirements for appointment of counsel).
We reject as meritless Lovelace’s contention that the district court failed to
liberally construe the amended complaint.

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3 17-35499
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.

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