ANSELMO RAMOS-MORALES, AKA Francisco Perez-Mendoza v. JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ANSELMO RAMOS-MORALES, AKA
Francisco Perez-Mendoza,
Petitioner,
v.
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 15-71083
Agency No. A200-884-713
MEMORANDUM0 F0F
*
Appeal from the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted May 16, 2018*1
F1F
*
Seattle, Washington
Before: BERZON, THACKER,**2
F2F
* and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Anselmo Ramos-Morales (“Petitioner”) seeks review of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) and Immigration Judge (“IJ”) decisions denying his
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Stephanie Dawn Thacker, United States Circuit Judge
for the Fourth Circuit, sitting by designation.
FILED
MAY 24 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention
Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1),
and we deny the petition for review.
1. The statute governing withholding of removal requires a demonstration that
the petitioner’s “life or freedom would be threatened in that country because of the
[petitioner’s] race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). “[A] petitioner may establish eligibility
for withholding of removal (A) by establishing a presumption of fear of future
persecution based on past persecution, or (B) through an independent showing of
clear probability of future persecution.” Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083, 1091
(9th Cir. 2010) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1), (2)).
2. The BIA’s rejection of Petitioner’s argument that, in Guatemala, he faced
economic and societal discrimination on account of his Mam ethnicity that rises to
the level of persecution was based on substantial evidence. Our decisions
recognizing economic harm as persecution are grounded in an individualized
showing of harm. See, e.g., Baballah v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1067, 1071–72, 1075
(9th Cir. 2004) (recognizing economic persecution where Israeli Marines
“deliberately interfered” with the petitioner’s attempts to maintain a fishing business
by destroying his fishing nets, frightening his crew, and making sure he received
unwarranted citations); Gonzalez v. INS, 82 F.3d 903, 906, 910 (9th Cir. 1996)

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(finding economic persecution where petitioner “was forced to liquidate her business
because she was denied the card she would need from the Ministry of Commerce to
buy inventory”); see also Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 104, 107 (9th Cir. 1969)
(ordering reopening of immigration proceedings where petitioner alleged economic
harm because Yugoslavian police “contacted his employers and caused him to lose
several jobs as a chef, and to be turned away when seeking employment while others
less qualified were hired”). Here, Petitioner, alleging only that his “people[,] the
Mam[,] face systemic discrimination in Guatemala,” has not demonstrated
individualized economic harm.
3. Substantial evidence also supported the BIA’s rejection of Petitioner’s
claim that he has demonstrated a clear probability of future persecution as a member
of his nuclear family. A “clear probability” means “it is ‘more likely than not’ that
the petitioner would be subject to persecution on account of one of the protected
grounds.” Tamang, 598 F.3d at 1091 (quoting INS v. Cardoza–Fonseca, 480 U.S.
421, 429 (1987)). Petitioner asserts that his father received vague death threats after
Petitioner’s uncle was killed. But where a petitioner’s “fear of future persecution
rests solely upon threats received by his family, it is especially significant that his
family . . . continues to live [in Guatemala] unharmed, after being threatened.” Id.
at 1094. “[A] petitioner’s fear of future persecution is weakened, even undercut,
when similarly-situated family members living in the petitioner’s home country are

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not harmed.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Petitioner’s father received vague
threats and still resides in Guatemala unharmed. Petitioner has not demonstrated a
clear probability of future persecution as a member of his nuclear family.
4. “[T]o qualify for CAT protection, a petitioner must show it is more likely
than not he or she would be tortured if removed to the country of origin.” Id. at
1095. “The same ‘more likely than not’ standard applies to CAT protection as it
does to withholding of removal; however, for CAT protection, the harm feared must
meet the definition of torture.” Id. For the same reasons Petitioner has failed to
show a clear probability of future harm for withholding of removal, he has failed to
show that it is more likely than not that he would be tortured if removed to
Guatemala.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

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