Carey Clayton Mills v. Scott Wood;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CAREY CLAYTON MILLS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SCOTT WOOD; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
KURT KANAM,
Intervenor-Defendant-
Appellee.
No. 17-35434
D.C. No. 4:10-cv-00033-RRB
MEMORANDUM*
CAREY CLAYTON MILLS,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
DOYON LIMITED,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
No. 17-35459
D.C. No. 4:10-cv-00033-RRB
FILED
JUN 13 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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SCOTT WOOD and HUNGWITCHIN
CORPORATION,
Defendants,
KURT KANAM,
Intervenor-Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Alaska
Ralph R. Beistline, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 11, 2018**
Anchorage OldFedBldg, Alaska
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and CALLAHAN and BEA, Circuit Judges.
Carey Mills appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
Defendants Scott Wood, Kurt Kanam, Doyon Limited, and Hungwitchin
Corporation in his dispute regarding access to his mining claims via the Fortymile
Station Eagle Trail (“the Trail”). Because the parties are familiar with the factual
and procedural history of the case, we need not recount it here.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the district
court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, Oswalt v. Resolute Indus., Inc., 642
F.3d 856, 859 (9th Cir. 2011), and we affirm.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
2

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Given that Alaska has designated a public right-of-way for the Trail, the
district court did not err in holding that any rights to access that Mills may have in
the Trail are limited to the rights of the general public, which include ingress and
egress but not construction. Thus, the district court properly held that Mills was
not entitled to improve the Trail to access his mining claims. Given this holding,
the district court properly declined to define the precise location of the Trail
because it was irrelevant to the court’s holding.1
The record supports the district court’s conclusion that Mills did not produce
any evidence suggesting he had suffered a compensable injury caused by Wood,
Kanam, Doyon, or Hungwitchin. Disputing the existence of a right-of-way
throughout the course of litigation does not constitute a physical denial of access.
Mills’s other arguments are similarly meritless.
Mills identifies no abuse of discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 2202 or in the
court’s order regarding attorney’s fees.
Because Doyon ultimately prevailed, we need not consider its cross-appeal
challenging the court’s earlier denial of summary judgment.
AFFIRMED.
1 The district court also properly noted that a future quiet title action could
have an effect on the determination of rights-of-way on the Trail, but to do so in
the absence of a quiet title action would be premature.
3

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