United States of America v. AMADO OCHOA, AKA Big Dog

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
AMADO OCHOA, AKA Big Dog,
Defendant-Appellant.
Nos. 16-50309, 16-50310
D.C. Nos.
2:14-cr-00557-FMO-1,
2:14-cr-00553-FMO-3
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Fernando M. Olguin, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted April 9, 2018
Pasadena, California
Before: BEA and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges, and KEELEY,** District Judge.
Amado Ochoa appeals his jury conviction for engaging in the business of
unlicensed firearms dealing in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A). Ochoa
argues that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he engaged in the business
FILED
JUN 14 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The Honorable Irene M. Keeley, United States District Judge for the
Northern District of West Virginia, sitting by designation.

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of firearms dealing without a license. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1291, and we affirm.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A), it is unlawful for any person “except a
licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, or licensed dealer, to engage in the
business of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms.” “[E]ngaged in the
business” as applied to a “dealer in firearms” is defined as “a person who devotes
time, attention, and labor to dealing in firearms as a regular course of trade or
business with the principal objective of livelihood and profit through the repetitive
purchase and resale of firearms, but such term shall not include a person who
makes occasional sales, exchanges, or purchases of firearms for the enhancement
of a personal collection or for a hobby, or who sells all or part of his personal
collection of firearms.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(21)(C).
Ochoa does not dispute that he acted as a broker of firearms between the
confidential informant and various sellers. Rather, Ochoa argues that brokering is
not included in § 922(a)(1)(A)’s ambit. On the contrary, § 922(a)(1)(A) reaches
those who hold themselves out as sources of firearms. See United States v. King,
735 F.3d 1098, 1107 (9th Cir. 2013) (upholding sufficiency of evidence for
conviction of a defendant who “held himself out as a firearms dealer”). “It is
enough to prove that the accused has guns on hand or is ready and able to procure
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them for the purpose of selling them from time to time to such persons as might be
accepted as customers.” United States v. Breier, 813 F.2d 212, 213-14 (9th Cir.
1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “Section 922(a)(1)(A) does
not require an actual sale of firearms.” King, 735 F.3d at 1107 n.8. The language
of the statute does not require a defendant personally to carry out repetitive
purchases and sales of firearms; the statute requires “the repetitive purchase and
resale of firearms,” not “defendant’s repetitive purchase and resale of firearms.” 18
U.S.C. § 921(a)(21)(C) (emphasis added). Here, while the evidence demonstrated
that Ochoa did not purchase and sell firearms himself, it was sufficient to
demonstrate that he had the principle objective of making a profit through the
repetitive purchase and sale of firearms, even if those purchases and sales were
carried out by others.
AFFIRMED.
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