Richard Scott Kindred v. Marisa Bigot; Kenneth Bell

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RICHARD SCOTT KINDRED,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MARISA BIGOT; KENNETH BELL,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 17-17431
D.C. No. 1:14-cv-01652-AWI-MJS
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Anthony W. Ishii, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 12, 2018**
Before: RAWLINSON, CLIFTON, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
California civil detainee Richard Scott Kindred appeals pro se from the
district court’s order denying his motions for a preliminary injunction and a
temporary restraining order. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).
We review for an abuse of discretion. Religious Tech. Ctr., Church of Scientology
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JUN 20 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Int’l, Inc. v. Scott, 869 F.2d 1306, 1309 (9th Cir. 1989). We affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kindred’s requests
for preliminary injunctive relief against Bell because Kindred failed to demonstrate
that he would likely suffer irreparable harm in the absence of the requested relief.
See Jackson v. City & County of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 958 (9th Cir. 2014)
(setting forth requirements for obtaining a preliminary injunction); Stuhlbarg Int’l
Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001)
(explaining that standards for issuing a temporary restraining order and a
preliminary injunction are “substantially identical”); Goldie’s Bookstore v.
Superior Court, 739 F.2d 466, 472 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Speculative injury does not
constitute irreparable injury.”); see also Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118, 1128
(9th Cir. 2001) (“In general, injunctive relief is to be used sparingly, and only in a
clear and plain case.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kindred’s requests
for preliminary injunctive relief against individuals not before the district court
because the district court could not provide relief against such individuals. See
Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1985) (federal courts “may not attempt
to determine the rights of persons not before the court”).
We reject as unsupported by the record Kindred’s contentions that
defendants did not serve Kindred copies of defendants’ motions to strike and that

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the district court failed to recognize Kindred is a civil detainee.
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.

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