The AI workspace for legal professionals
- Legal research with access to more than 1 million sources
- Document automation
- Matter management
- Hosted in the EU and Switzerland
Try it free for 14 days (10 questions/day during trial)
The AI workspace for legal professionals
Try it free for 14 days (10 questions/day during trial)
17-15581•Matthew Douglas White v. JOE A. LIZARRAGA, Warden
17-15581Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitJun 26, 2018
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MATTHEW DOUGLAS WHITE,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
JOE A. LIZARRAGA, Warden,
Respondent-Appellee.
No. 17-15581
D.C. No.
2:14-cv-01797-JKS-EFB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
James K. Singleton, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted June 15, 2018
San Francisco, California
Before: MURPHY,** PAEZ, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Matthew Douglas White appeals the district court’s denial of his
habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court granted a certificate of
appealability (“COA”) on whether White received ineffective assistance of counsel
(“IAC”) regarding a ten-year plea offer made to White. We have jurisdiction
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The Honorable Michael R. Murphy, United States Circuit Judge for
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.
FILED
JUN 26 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
-- 1 of 3 --
2
under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. We review de novo the district court’s legal
determination and we review for clear error factual findings made by the district
court. See Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768, 777 (9th Cir. 2014). We affirm.
1. In rejecting White’s ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claim, the
district court determined that the California Supreme Court’s denial of habeas
relief was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts under 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(2). Following this determination the district court held an evidentiary
hearing and then reviewed White’s IAC claim de novo in light of the expanded
evidentiary record. See Hurles, 753 F.3d at 778, 790-92. We need not decide
whether the district court erred in its § 2254(d)(2) determination, because its
factual findings after the evidentiary hearing were not clearly erroneous and, as
noted below, fully support the denial of White’s IAC claim.
Given that Platt’s testimony that White insisted on going to trial was
supported by Conley’s testimony, the district court did not clearly err by crediting
Platt’s testimony over White’s. Having credited Platt’s testimony, the district court
did not clearly err in finding that in advising White, Platt followed his custom and
practice of informing his clients of any plea offers, that Platt had nothing to gain
from proceeding to trial, and that White desired to go to trial. Given these
findings, the district court did not err in concluding that under Lafler v. Cooper,
-- 2 of 3 --
3
566 U.S. 156, 163-66 (2012), White received effective assistance of counsel
regarding the 10 year offer.
2. We also deny a COA on White’s IAC claim regarding his counsel’s
stipulation that his BAC was .16. The state court reasonably rejected White’s
claim that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by entering into
this stipulation, on the ground that White had failed to show prejudice. The district
court’s conclusion that the state court’s decision was not an unreasonable
application of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984), is not debatable
among jurists of reason. See Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 773 (2017). We
therefore do not grant a COA on this claim. See id.
AFFIRMED.
-- 3 of 3 --
Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.