Yun Ju Yi v. JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
YUN JU YI,
Petitioner,
v.
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 17-71217
Agency No. A076-867-246
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted June 11, 2018
Anchorage Old Federal Building, Alaska
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and CALLAHAN and BEA, Circuit Judges.
Yun Ju Yi (Yi) challenges the denial of a waiver from the requirement that
she file a joint petition with her U.S. husband to remove the conditions on her
permanent resident status pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(C). Yi argues that
she was denied due process in the immigration proceedings and that she
FILED
JUL 06 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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demonstrated that she was entitled to a good faith marriage waiver. We deny the
petition for review.1
1. Yi asserts that she was deprived of due process because the interpreter
translated her testimony as stating that she grew to “like” her husband, Nolan,
rather than grew to “love” Nolan. We have recognized that due process requires an
applicant be given competent translation services. See He v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d
593, 598 (9th Cir. 2003). To make out a violation of due process as a result of an
inadequate translation, petitioner must demonstrate that a better translation likely
would have made a difference in the outcome of the hearing. Acewicz v. INS, 984
F.2d 1056, 1063 (9th Cir. 1993); Kotasz v. INS, 31 F.3d 847, 850 n.2 (9th Cir.
1994). In addition, petitioner must show prejudice. United States v. Ramos, 623
F.3d 672, 680 (9th Cir. 2010).
Here, there is evidence only that the word “like” could have been translated
to “love,” not that it was, in fact, mistranslated. Although the Immigration Judge
(IJ) noted that Yi had testified that she grew to “like” Nolan, the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) stated that it could not “conclude that the [IJ]’s
reliance on [Yi]’s testimony that she grew to ‘like’ Nolan, as opposed to growing
1 Because the parties are familiar with the factual and procedural
history of the case, we need not recount it here.
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to ‘love’ him, is significant to the [IJ]’s determination that [Yi] did not establish a
bona fide marriage.” This determination is supported by substantial evidence. See
Zhi v. Holder, 751 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 2014) (“We may reverse factual
determinations only when ‘any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to
conclude to the contrary’ based on the evidence in the record.” (citation omitted)).
Moreover, Yi fails to establish that she suffered prejudice as a result of this
potential mistranslation.
2. Yi’s assertion that the BIA engaged in impermissible de novo review of
the IJ’s findings is not well taken. See 8 C. F. R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(I). The BIA did
not impermissibly “re-weigh” the factors in this case. Instead of deciding whether
Yi’s testimony should be translated as “like” or “love,” the BIA determined that
any “mistranslation” was insignificant because the other evidence before the IJ was
sufficient to support the IJ’s finding that the marriage was not entered into in good
faith.
3. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Yi did not
demonstrate that she entered into a good faith marriage. For us to reverse under
the substantial evidence standard, “the evidence must be so compelling that no
reasonable factfinder could fail to find the facts were as the alien alleged.” Singh v.
Reno, 113 F.3d 1512, 1514 (9th Cir. 1997); INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478,
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483–84 (1992). Here, the agency based its determination that Yi failed to establish
she entered into a good faith marriage with Nolan on a number of findings,
including that: (1) Yi and Nolan did not commingle finances; (2) Yi and Nolan
lived together for only 2 months after she received conditional permanent
residency; (3)Yi and Nolan lived in separate bedrooms; and (4) there were no
photographs of Yi and Nolan living as a couple. This is sufficient. Even if the
agency could have concluded otherwise, the evidence does not compel such a
conclusion. See Oropeza-Wong v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 1135, 1148 (9th Cir. 2005)
(“Although it might be possible to reach a contrary conclusion on the basis of the
record, under the substantial evidence standard, the evidence presented here does
not compel a finding that Oropeza met his burden of proving that the marriage was
entered into in good faith.”).
4. Because Yi has not shown that the agency was compelled to find that she
entered into a good faith marriage, we need not, and do not, decide whether Yi was
subject to “extreme cruelty.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(C).
The petition for review is denied.
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