In re: SONJA RITTER v. LOIS I. BRADY, Chapter 7 Trustee

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: SONJA RITTER,
Debtor.
------------------------------
SONJA RITTER,
Appellant,
v.
LOIS I. BRADY, Chapter 7 Trustee,
Appellee.
No. 17-60064
BAP No. 17-1001
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the Ninth Circuit
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
Faris, Brand, and Jury, Bankruptcy Judges, Presiding
Submitted July 10, 2018**
Before: CANBY, W. FLETCHER, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Sonja Ritter appeals pro se from the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s (“BAP”)
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JUL 13 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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judgment affirming the bankruptcy court’s order denying her motion to reopen her
bankruptcy case. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We review de
novo BAP decisions and apply the same standard of review that the BAP applied
to the bankruptcy court’s ruling. Boyajian v. New Falls Corp. (In re Boyajian),
564 F.3d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm.
The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by denying Ritter’s motion
to reopen and motion for reconsideration because Ritter failed to demonstrate
grounds for such relief. See Curry v. Castillo (In re Castillo), 297 F.3d 940, 945
(9th Cir. 2002) (“A bankruptcy court’s decision to reopen is entirely within its
sound discretion, based upon the circumstances of each case.” (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)); Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc.,
5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (standard of review and grounds for relief
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) or 60(b)); see also Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9023, 9024
(making Rules 59 and 60 applicable to bankruptcy cases). Contrary to Ritter’s
contention, the Supreme Court has held that the lien avoidance mechanism in 11
U.S.C. § 506(d) is not available when a claim secured by a lien has been allowed
under § 502. See Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 416-20 (1992); accord Bank of
Am., N.A. v. Caulkett, 135 S. Ct. 1995, 1999-2001 (2015) (applying Dewsnup’s
interpretation of § 506(d) to wholly underwater mortgage liens).
We reject as without merit Ritter’s contention that the bankruptcy court was

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required to grant her motion to avoid PNC Bank’s junior lien on the basis of PNC
Bank’s failure to oppose the motion. We reject as unsupported by the record
Ritter’s contentions that the bankruptcy court was biased against her as a pro se
litigant or failed to give due consideration to her motion to reopen or motion for
reconsideration.
AFFIRMED.

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