Jack R. Finnegan v. City of Dana Point;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JACK R. FINNEGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CITY OF DANA POINT; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 17-56200
D.C. No. 8:17-cv-00976-DSF-DFM
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Dale S. Fischer, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 15, 2018**
Before: FARRIS, BYBEE, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Jack R. Finnegan appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims arising from
state court proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review
de novo a dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
AUG 21 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 17-56200
1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Finnegan’s action as barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine because Finnegan’s action is a “de facto appeal” of a
prior state court judgment, and he raises issues that are “inextricably intertwined”
with that judgment. See Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 782 (9th Cir. 2012)
(concluding plaintiff’s claim for conspiracy was “inextricably intertwined” with
the state court’s decision); Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 616 (9th
Cir. 2007) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred plaintiff's claim because the relief
sought “would require the district court to determine the state court’s decision was
wrong and thus void”).
AFFIRMED.

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