Julio Cesar Santibanez-Allocer v. JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JULIO CESAR SANTIBANEZ-ALLOCER,
Petitioner,
v.
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 17-70359
Agency No. A205-405-752
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted August 15, 2018**
Before: FARRIS, BYBEE, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Julio Cesar Santibanez-Allocer, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal
from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his request for a continuance,
and denying his application for cancellation of removal. Our jurisdiction is
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
AUG 23 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the agency’s
denial of a continuance. Ahmed v. Holder, 569 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 2009).
We review de novo constitutional claims and questions of law. Mohammed v.
Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2005). We deny in part and dismiss in
part the petition for review.
The agency did not abuse its discretion or violate due process in denying for
lack of good cause Santibanez-Allocer’s request for a continuance. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.29, Ahmed, 569 F.3d at 1012 (listing factors to consider); Lata v. INS, 204
F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2000) (requiring error and substantial prejudice to
prevail on a due process challenge).
In the absence of legal or constitutional error, we lack jurisdiction to review
the agency’s discretionary determination that Santibanez-Allocer lacked good
moral character under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f). See Moran v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1089,
1091 (9th Cir. 2005) (good moral character determination only reviewable if it is
based on a per se exclusion category listed in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(1)-(9)), overruled
on other grounds by Sanchez v. Holder, 560 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2009). Santibanez-
Allocer has provided no support for his contention that the agency erred in
considering his DUI history in its discretionary good moral character analysis, and
he failed to show a legal or constitutional error that would give rise to our
jurisdiction. See Planes v. Holder, 652 F.3d 991, 999 (9th Cir. 2011) (dismissing

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petition challenging discretionary denial of cancellation where petitioner failed to
raise a colorable legal or constitutional challenge to the agency’s discretionary
decision).
Because the discretionary good moral character determination is dispositive,
we do not reach Santibanez-Allocer’s contention regarding the IJ’s per se good
moral character determination under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(7). See Simeonov v.
Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 2004) (courts and agencies are not required
to reach non-dispositive issues).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.

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