Susan Beach v. Liberty Life Assurance Company of Boston

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SUSAN BEACH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
LIBERTY LIFE ASSURANCE
COMPANY OF BOSTON,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 17-16492
D.C. No. 5:15-cv-04737-BLF
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Beth Labson Freeman, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 6, 2019
San Francisco, California
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, PAEZ, Circuit Judge, and FEINERMAN,**
District Judge.
Susan Beach appeals the district court’s denial of long-term disability
benefits under the terms of the Leland Stanford Junior University Long Term
Disability Plan (the “plan”), which is administered by Liberty Life Assurance
FILED
MAR 15 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The Honorable Gary Feinerman, United States District Judge for the
Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

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Company (“Liberty”). We affirm the denial of benefits under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.
We review a denial of benefits under an ERISA plan de novo and mixed questions
of law and fact, including whether the appellant was disabled, for clear error.
Deegan v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 167 F.3d 502, 506 (9th Cir. 1999). Because the parties
are familiar with the history of this case, we need not recount it here.
The district court did not clearly err in its determination that Beach was not
disabled under the terms of the policy, nor did it commit any legal errors. To
succeed on her claim, Beach was required to establish that she is disabled under the
terms of the plan. Muniz v. Amec Constr. Mgmt., Inc., 623 F.3d 1290, 1295–96
(9th Cir. 2010). The relevant plan provision—the “any occupation”
standard—provides that an individual is entitled to long-term benefits only when
she is “unable to perform, with reasonable continuity, all of the material and
substantial duties of [her] own or any other occupation for which [she] is or
becomes reasonably fitted by training, education, experience, age and physical and
mental capacity.” Ample evidence in the record supports the determination that
Beach retained the ability to sustain employment, including the opinion of Beach’s
treating physician that she was not disabled, Beach’s own self-reported ability to
sit for five to six hours and stand for three hours, and multiple medical opinions
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stating that Beach could sustain at least part-time work. In light of this evidence,
the district court did not clearly err in denying benefits under the “any occupation”
standard.
Harlick v. Blue Shield of California, 686 F.3d 699 (9th Cir. 2012), does not
compel the opposite conclusion. Harlick holds that a plan administrator must rely
on a consistent reason throughout its initial denials and subsequent litigation in
order to permit a claimant to adequately challenge the denial of benefits. Id. at
719–20. Thus, a plan administrator cannot assert a new reason for the denial of
benefits during litigation upon which it had not relied in its initial determinations.
Id.
Before the district court, Liberty consistently relied on the “any occupation”
standard as the basis for denial. In addition, Liberty continuously supported its
denial with the opinions and reports of Beach and her physicians—many of which
were explicitly summarized in the initial determinations, and all of which were
properly incorporated in the record. Liberty did advance some new factual
arguments, but these did not constitute a new reason prohibited by Harlick. The
reason advanced by Liberty was founded solely on information in the record and
adequately permitted Beach to pursue her appeals and litigation.
AFFIRMED.
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