Juan Ramon Turuy Toxcon v. WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JUAN RAMON TURUY TOXCON,
Petitioner,
v.
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 15-73194
Agency No. A087-681-989
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 14, 2019**
San Francisco, California
Before: M. SMITH, WATFORD, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
An immigration judge (“IJ”) denied Juan Turuy Toxcon’s application for
asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”). The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed Turuy’s appeal. We have
jurisdiction of Turuy’s petition for review under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAR 18 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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petition in part, grant it in part, and remand.
1. We deny the petition for review of the denial of Turuy’s asylum claim.
a. Substantial evidence supported the IJ’s finding that Turuy did not suffer
economic persecution in his native Guatemala. Economic persecution is “a
substantial economic disadvantage that interferes with the applicant’s livelihood.”
Ming Xin He v. Holder, 749 F.3d 792, 796 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotations
omitted). Although Turuy may have been denied advancement opportunities at the
bank where he worked, he retained his job and any discrimination did not interfere
with his ability to support himself or his family. Substantial evidence also supported
the IJ’s finding that Turuy’s experience with bullying at school and other incidents
of childhood discrimination did not rise to the level of persecution. See Nagoulko v.
INS, 333 F.3d 1012, 1016 (9th Cir. 2003).
b. Substantial evidence also supported the IJ’s findings that the incidents of
violence towards others cited by Turuy involved private criminal activity and that
any connection to Turuy was speculative. See Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049,
1060 (9th Cir. 2009).
c. Although Turuy was robbed three times outside the bank where he worked,
the record—including the robbers’ use of ethnic slurs—does not compel the
conclusion that Turuy’s ethnicity was a “central reason” for the attacks.
Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 740-42 (9th Cir. 2009).

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2. We also deny the petition with respect to CAT relief. Substantial evidence
supported the IJ’s conclusion that it is not “more likely than not” Turuy will be
tortured if returned to Guatemala. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2); Ramirez-Munoz v.
Lynch, 816 F.3d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 2016). “[G]eneralized evidence of violence
and crime in [Guatemala] is not particular to [Turuy] and is insufficient to meet” the
standard for CAT protection. Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th
Cir. 2010).
3. We grant the petition with respect to Turuy’s application for withholding
of removal. We recently clarified that the nexus requirement for withholding—that
a protected ground be “a reason” for persecution—is less demanding than the “one
central reason” standard applicable to claims for asylum. Barajas-Romero v. Lynch,
846 F.3d 351, 360 (9th Cir. 2017). The IJ did not consider whether Turuy’s ethnicity
was “a reason” for the robberies, even if not “a central reason.” We therefore remand
for a determination of whether the robberies constituted persecution, and if so,
whether Turuy’s ethnicity was “a reason” for that persecution.
PETITION DENIED IN PART AND GRANTED IN PART.
REMANDED.

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