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17-50136•United States of America v. Julio Cesar Alvarado
17-50136Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitMar 18, 2019
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JULIO CESAR ALVARADO,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 17-50136
D.C. No.
8:16-cr-00085-DMG-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Dolly M. Gee, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 7, 2019
Pasadena, California
Before: WARDLAW and BENNETT, Circuit Judges, and CARDONE,** District
Judge.
Julio Cesar Alvarado appeals his conviction for being a felon in possession
of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He contends that the district
court erroneously denied his motion to suppress the firearm found in his Acura
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The Honorable Kathleen Cardone, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Texas, sitting by designation.
FILED
MAR 18 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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because the police initiated an investigatory stop without reasonable suspicion
before searching his vehicle. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we
affirm.
1. The district court properly concluded that Santa Ana Police
Department Officers Gerardo Raya and John Pace seized Alvarado when they
simultaneously parked their marked patrol cars perpendicular to the Acura he
occupied and shone their spotlights into the car. See United States v. Washington,
490 F.3d 765, 769–70 (9th Cir. 2007). Under the totality of the circumstances, a
reasonable person would not have felt at liberty to terminate the encounter and
leave after the officers parked their patrol cars in this manner. See id. at 771–74.
Moreover, the position of the officers’ parked patrol cars in the cul-de-sac,1 and the
use of their spotlights, which would affect Alvarado’s vision, likely restricted
Alvarado’s ability to leave. See id. at 773. The encounter took place late at night
in an isolated residential setting, and neither officer informed Alvarado of his right
to terminate the encounter. See id. at 772. While the government points out that
the officers did not brandish any weapons and did not outnumber Alvarado and his
passenger, “in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a
reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
1 Alvarado’s request for judicial notice is GRANTED. (Dkt. No. 23).
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2. The district court correctly concluded that the officers had reasonable
suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop when they seized Alvarado. See United
States v. Valdes-Vega, 738 F.3d 1074, 1078–79 (9th Cir. 2013). The officers had
reasonable suspicion that Alvarado was committing an ongoing parking violation
based on a tip demonstrating “sufficient indicia of reliability.” Navarette v.
California, 572 U.S. 393, 397–401 (2014) (citation omitted); see United States v.
Choudhry, 461 F.3d 1097, 1101–02 (9th Cir. 2006) (reasonable suspicion of a
parking violation under California’s civil-administrative enforcement scheme is
sufficient to justify an investigative stop). The tipster provided his name and
phone number to the dispatcher, and reported a suspicious vehicle––a green Honda
Accord––in a residential cul-de-sac. When the officers arrived at the specified
location, they found a car closely matching the description and location provided
by the tipster, parked adjacent to a narrow length of curb between two driveways.
The tipster also provided specific allegations of ongoing, observable criminal
activity––that the car was parked in a red zone. The officers were not required to
corroborate that there was an ongoing parking violation before conducting the
investigatory stop. See United States v. Williams, 846 F.3d 303, 309–10 (9th Cir.
2016) (concluding there was reasonable suspicion because the officers were able to
verify a tip regarding the make, model, and location of a car, even though they did
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not verify the allegations of ongoing, observable criminal activity prior to the
stop).
AFFIRMED.
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