Keith Preston Nance v. ALLEN MISER, Senior Chaplain at Florence Complex ADC;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KEITH PRESTON NANCE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ALLEN MISER, Senior Chaplain at
Florence Complex ADC; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 18-15628
D.C. No. 2:14-cv-00500-SMM
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Stephen M. McNamee, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 17, 2019**
Before: McKEOWN, BYBEE, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Arizona state prisoner Keith Preston Nance appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment in his action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) alleging that defendants
interfered with the practice of his religion. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
APR 24 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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§ 1291. We review de novo. Rosebrock v. Mathis, 745 F.3d 963, 970 n.8 (9th
Cir. 2014) (dismissal on the basis of mootness); United States v. Kellington, 217
F.3d 1084, 1092 (9th Cir. 2000) (a district court’s compliance with a mandate).
We affirm.
In Nance’s prior appeal, we remanded for the district court to enter summary
judgment in favor of Nance regarding “his request to order scented oils from an
approved vendor . . . .” Nance v. Miser, 700 F. App’x 629, 633 (9th Cir. June 29,
2017). The district court complied with our mandate by entering a final judgment
and permanent injunction that orders defendants to permit Nance to purchase, with
some limitations, scented oils from an approved vendor of religious products for
Muslims.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by entering the permanent
injunction with restrictions on the size of the bottles of scented oil that Nance is
now allowed to purchase. See Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d
1020, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013) (standard of review); Kellington, 217 F.3d at 1094 (a
mandate “leaves to the district court any issue not expressly or impliedly disposed
of on appeal” (citations omitted)); see also Worldwide Church of God v. Phila.
Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1121 (9th Cir. 2000) (substantial burden
under RLUIPA must be “more than an inconvenience”). We reject as unsupported
by the record Nance’s contentions that the scented oils he can now purchase do not

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comply with Islamic law.
The district court properly dismissed as moot Nance’s RLUIPA claim
regarding the length of his beard because defendants have instituted a permanent
grooming waiver. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC),
Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 170 (2000) (“A case might become moot if subsequent events
made it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably
be expected to occur.” (citation omitted)).
We do not consider allegations that were not raised in the operative
complaint, including Nance’s due process claim. See Crawford v. Lungren, 96
F.3d 380, 389 n.6 (9th Cir. 1996) (declining to address claims raised for the first
time on appeal).
AFFIRMED.

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