Maria Teresa Abrego, individually and as Successor-in-Interest of Decedent Omar Abrego; v. City of Los Angeles;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARIA TERESA ABREGO, individually
and as Successor-in-Interest of Decedent
Omar Abrego; et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
CITY OF LOS ANGELES; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 17-56860
D.C. No.
2:15-cv-00039-BRO-JEM
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Virginia A. Phillips, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 14, 2019**
Pasadena, California
Before: NGUYEN and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and ANTOON,*** District Judge.
Plaintiffs appeal from the district court’s order denying their motion to tax
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable John Antoon II, United States District Judge for the
Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation.
FILED
MAY 17 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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costs as untimely under a local rule. As the parties are familiar with the facts, we
do not recount them here. We affirm.
The district court determined that Plaintiffs’ motion to tax costs was
untimely under Local Rule 54-2.1 because it was filed several months after the
court dismissed the case with prejudice pursuant to the parties’ stipulation. At the
time, Local Rule 54-2.1 provided that an application to tax costs must be filed
“[w]ithin 14 days after the entry of judgment.” C.D. Cal. Civ. R. 54-2.1 (2017).
Here, pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, the district court’s dismissal order stated
that “no judgment shall be entered.” Plaintiffs argue that because technically there
was no “entry of judgment,” the 14-day deadline of Local Rule 54-2.1 was not
triggered, and thus their motion to tax costs was timely.
However, given the parties’ stipulation to voluntarily dismiss the case with
prejudice and no entry of judgment, the district court did not err in construing the
dismissal order as triggering Local Rule 54-2.1’s deadline. See Taylor Rental
Corp. v. Oakley, 764 F.2d 720, 721-22 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that an appeal was
untimely even though no separate document had been entered to trigger the time to
appeal because the parties had stipulated that the district court need not enter a
formal order).
As a result of the parties’ stipulation, this case is distinguishable from Radio
Television Espanola S.A. v. New World Entertainment, Ltd., 183 F.3d 922, 929-32

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(9th Cir. 1999), where we held that a district court erred by denying an application
for costs as untimely under Local Rule 54-2.1 because a minute order granting
summary judgment did not constitute “entry of judgment,” and thus did not trigger
the deadline to apply for costs.
AFFIRMED.

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