April Lindblom v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
APRIL LINDBLOM,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
SANTANDER CONSUMER USA, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee,
v.
VICKI BLAKELY; et al.,
Movants-Appellants.
No. 18-16393
D.C. No. 1:15-cv-00990-BAM
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Barbara McAuliffe, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 3, 2019**
Seattle, Washington
Before: D.W. NELSON, RAWLINSON, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
This case concerns Movants’ motions for permissive intervention. We have
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JUN 5 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 3 --

2
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm the district court’s denial of
permissive intervention.
The district court acted within its broad discretion when it denied Movants’
motion for permissive intervention as untimely under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 24(b). See Orange Cty. v. Air Cal., 799 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 1986).
The district court identified and applied the correct legal rule to determine whether
the motions for permissive intervention were timely, see United States v. Hinkson,
585 F.3d 1247, 1262 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc), by analyzing “(1) the stage of the
proceeding at which an applicant seeks to intervene; (2) the prejudice to other
parties; and (3) the reason for and length of the delay,” United States v. Alisal
Water Corp., 370 F.3d 915, 921 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Contrary to Movants’ assertion, American Pipe and China Agritech are
irrelevant to Movants’ claims that the district court abused its discretion in denying
their motions for permissive intervention. See China Agritech, Inc. v. Resh, 138 S.
Ct. 1800, 1804 (2018); Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 562 (1974)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting that the proposed intervenors may be barred
from intervention “if the district judge, in his discretion, concludes that the
intervention will ‘unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
original parties’” (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b))). Further, Movants’ argument
that they will be prejudiced if not allowed to intervene is irrelevant to the prejudice

-- 2 of 3 --

3
inquiry, in which the court considers the potential harm suffered by the original
parties to the suit. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3).
The district court’s conclusion that Movants’ motions for intervention were
untimely was neither illogical nor implausible, and it was based on inferences that
may be drawn from the record. Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1262.
AFFIRMED.

-- 3 of 3 --