Rachel Yould v. LINDA S. BARNARD, Ph.D., LMFT;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RACHEL YOULD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
LINDA S. BARNARD, Ph.D., LMFT; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 18-16968
D.C. No. 5:18-cv-01255-EJD
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Edward J. Davila, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 11, 2019**
Before: CANBY, GRABER, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Rachel Yould appeals from the district court’s order denying her motion for
reconsideration in her diversity action arising out of the services provided to Yould
by defendants in connection with her criminal prosecution. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion. Sch. Dist. No. 1J,
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JUN 14 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 18-16968
Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262 (9th Cir. 1993). We
affirm.
We have an independent obligation to determine the district court’s
jurisdiction, see Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.), Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 954 (9th
Cir. 2011), and we conclude on the basis of clarifications provided by Yould in her
objections to the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations, that the district
court had subject matter jurisdiction over this action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)
(requirements for diversity jurisdiction).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Yould’s motion for
reconsideration because Yould failed to establish any basis for such relief. See
Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., 5 F.3d at 1262-63 (grounds for reconsideration
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and 60(b)); see also McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172,
1179-80 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal under Rule 8, and recognizing that
“[p]rolix, confusing complaints . . . impose unfair burdens on litigants and
judges”).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.

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