Michael Hucul v. County of San Diego;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MICHAEL HUCUL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 18-55354
D.C. No. 3:17-cv-01531-JLS-DHB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Janis L. Sammartino, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 11, 2019**
Before: CANBY, GRABER, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Michael Hucul appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
his action alleging a violation of the Right to Financial Privacy Act (“RFPA”). We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003).
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JUN 18 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 2 --

2 18-55354
We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Hucul’s action as barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine because it is a de facto appeal of prior state court
decisions and raises claims that are inextricably intertwined with state court
decisions. See id. at 1163-65 (Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars de facto appeals of a
state court decision and claims “inextricably intertwined” with the state court
decision); see also Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855, 859 (9th Cir.
2008) (a de facto appeal is one in which “the adjudication of the federal claims
would undercut the state ruling or require the district court to interpret the
application of state laws or procedural rules” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted))
Appellee Griffin’s motion to take judicial notice (Docket Entry No. 13) is
denied.
AFFIRMED.

-- 2 of 2 --