Desideria San Lorenzo Culanag v. WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DESIDERIA SAN LORENZO CULANAG,
Petitioner,
v.
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 18-70043
Agency No. A099-800-446
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted July 11, 2019**
Portland, Oregon
Before: TASHIMA, GRABER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Desideria San Lorenzo Culanag, a native and citizen of the Philippines,
petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) final removal
order, dismissing her appeal from the immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying
her asylum and withholding from removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JUL 15 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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§ 1252, and we grant the petition.
1. The BIA erred in concluding that Culanag did not qualify for the
“changed circumstances” exception to the one-year filing deadline for asylum
applications. An asylum applicant must “demonstrate[] by clear and convincing
evidence that the application has been filed within 1 year after the date of the
[applicant]’s arrival in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). There is a
statutory exception to the one-year bar, however, if the applicant “demonstrates . . .
the existence of changed circumstances which materially affect the applicant’s
eligibility for asylum.” Id. § 1158(a)(2)(D). The applicant must also demonstrate
that she “file[d] an asylum application within a reasonable period given those
‘changed circumstances.’” 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(4)(ii).
The BIA incorrectly determined that the operative changed circumstances
could be only when the recent string of violence against Culanag’s family “began”
in 2007, and thus it was unreasonable for Culanag to wait until 2014 to file her
asylum application. We have interpreted the changed circumstances exception
broadly, and new events offering further evidence of an applicant’s eligibility for
asylum may suffice. See Singh v. Holder, 656 F.3d 1047, 1053 (9th Cir. 2011)
(“[A] petitioner might still qualify for the changed circumstances exception even if
the relevant circumstances do not create a new basis of persecution but simply
provide further evidence of the type of persecution already suffered.”); Vahora v.

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Holder, 641 F.3d 1038, 1044-45 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining that this exception
“w[as] intended to be broad” and does not “preclude an individual who has always
feared persecution from seeking asylum because the risk of that persecution
increases”). The BIA failed even to mention attacks on Culanag’s family that
occurred in 2013 in retaliation for her brother-in-law’s work as the head of the
local drug and narcotics police unit. Specifically, Culanag credibly testified about
at least three incidents in 2013—the murder of her second cousin, a death threat to
her nephew, and multiple death threats to her brother-in-law and sister.
2. The BIA also failed to discuss the 2013 attacks in concluding that
Culanag was ineligible for withholding of removal because she could reasonably
relocate within the Philippines to avoid future harm. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(2);
Lopez-Vasquez v. Holder, 706 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013) (stating the
standard of review). By overlooking these recent events, the BIA did not
sufficiently address whether it would be reasonable to expect her to relocate to
Manila. See Knezevic v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1206, 1215 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining
that the agency must “take into account the numerous factors for determining
reasonableness outlined in 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3),” including “whether the
applicant would face other serious harm in the place of suggested relocation; any
ongoing civil strife; administrative, economic, or judicial infrastructure”).
Accordingly, we grant the petition for review. We remand to the BIA to

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address whether those 2013 events constitute “changed circumstances” for
purposes of the exception to the one-year bar for asylum applications. If so, the
BIA may make an “individualized determination[]” of whether Culanag filed her
asylum application within a reasonable period of time after these incidents, in light
of “all the factual circumstances of the case.” Al Ramahi v. Holder, 725 F.3d
1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). The BIA must also determine the
impact, if any, of those 2013 events on the reasonableness of internal relocation as
it relates to Culanag’s application for withholding from removal.
PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED; REMANDED.

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