United States of America v. Hans Vincent Edling

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
HANS VINCENT EDLING,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 18-10359
D.C. No.
2:15-cr-00300-KJD-NJK-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Kent J. Dawson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 15, 2019**
Before: SCHROEDER, SILVERMAN, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
Hans Vincent Edling appeals from the district court’s judgment and
challenges the 51-month custodial sentence and 3-year term of supervised release
imposed upon remand for resentencing following his guilty-plea conviction for
being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JUL 18 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 3 --

2 18-10359
924(a)(2). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Edling contends that the district court impermissibly imposed the custodial
sentence in order to promote his rehabilitation in violation of Tapia v. United
States, 564 U.S. 319 (2011). The district court did not plainly err. See United
States v. Grant, 664 F.3d 276, 279 (9th Cir. 2011). Though the court stated that
Edling would have an opportunity to complete drug treatment while in custody,
this statement was responsive to the parties’ dispute regarding Edling’s efforts to
participate in drug treatment. The record does not suggest that the court imposed
or lengthened the sentence out of concern for Edling’s rehabilitative needs. See
Tapia, 564 U.S. at 334 (federal court does not run afoul of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) by
“discussing the opportunities for rehabilitation within prison”).
Edling next contends that the district court procedurally erred by failing to
explain adequately the term of supervised release. Again, the district court did not
plainly err. See United States v. Valencia-Barragan, 608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir.
2010). The record as a whole reflects the district court’s reasons for imposing the
same within-Guidelines term of supervised release it had previously imposed. See
United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (adequate
explanation may be inferred from the record as a whole).
Finally, Edling contends that the 51-month sentence is substantively
unreasonable in light of his health, his conduct since the first sentencing hearing,

-- 2 of 3 --

3 18-10359
his acceptance of responsibility, and his support network of family and friends.
The district court did not abuse its discretion. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 51 (2007). The sentence, which is at the low end of the Guidelines range, is
substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors and
the totality of the circumstances. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
AFFIRMED.

-- 3 of 3 --