Kajauna Kenyatta Irvin v. JAMES A. YATES, Warden;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KAJAUNA KENYATTA IRVIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JAMES A. YATES, Warden; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 18-15928
D.C. No. 1:10-cv-01940-DAD-SAB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Dale A. Drozd, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 8, 2019**
Before: FARRIS, D.W. NELSON, and TROTT, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Kajauna Kenyatta Irvin appeals pro se from the
district court’s summary judgment in his action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1030
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
AUG 12 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 4 --

2 18-15928
(9th Cir. 2015). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Irvin’s free
exercise claim related to chapel access because Irvin failed to raise a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether defendants’ actions substantially burdened
the practice of his religion or whether the regulations were not reasonably related
to a legitimate penological interest. See id. at 1031-32 (defining substantial burden
for purposes of the Free Exercise Clause); see also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,
89-90 (1987) (factors for determining whether a prison regulation is reasonably
related to a legitimate penological interest).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by granting in part Irvin’s
fourth motion to extend the time to file an opposition to defendants’ motion for
summary judgment because the district court warned Irvin that the court would not
grant further extensions and Irvin had over eight months to file an opposition. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1) (“When an act may or must be done within a specified time,
the court may, for good cause, extend the time . . . .”); Ahanchian v. Xenon
Pictures, Inc., 624 F.3d 1253, 1258-59 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth standard of
review and discussing good cause requirement for extensions of time).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Irvin’s motion to
stay proceedings because Irvin provided no justification for a stay, and the district
court’s assessment of the evidence was not clearly erroneous. See Dependable

-- 2 of 4 --

3 18-15928
Highway Express, Inc. v. Navigators Ins. Co., 498 F.3d 1059, 1066 (9th Cir. 2007)
(district court abuses its discretion in denying a stay if it bases its ruling on an
erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of evidence).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Irvin’s motion to
appoint counsel because Irvin failed to show exceptional circumstances. See
Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting forth standard of
review and “exceptional circumstances” requirement for appointment of counsel).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Irvin’s motion for
reconsideration because Irvin failed to demonstrate any grounds for relief. See
Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th
Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and listing grounds warranting
reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)).
We reject Irvin’s contention that the district court erred by denying his
motion “for postponement of hearing on defendants’ summary judgment motion.”
The district court could not grant the request because it had not scheduled a
hearing on the summary judgment motion. However, despite granting three prior
generous extensions and warning Irvin that it would grant no further extensions,
the district court sua sponte granted Irvin a fourth extension of time to oppose
summary judgment of almost three months to respond.
We do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal or matters

-- 3 of 4 --

4 18-15928
not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett
v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
Appellant’s motion concerning substitution of a party (Docket Entry No. 23)
is denied as unnecessary.
AFFIRMED.

-- 4 of 4 --