Joseph Leonetti, personally v. Patrick Bray;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOSEPH LEONETTI, personally and as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Holly Leonetti, deceased,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
PATRICK BRAY; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 18-35394
D.C. No. 3:16-cv-00014-AC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Marco A. Hernandez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 12, 2019**
Portland, Oregon
Before: TASHIMA, GRABER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Joseph Leonetti appeals the district court’s order granting
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Reviewing de novo, Szajer v. City of
Los Angeles, 632 F.3d 607, 610 (9th Cir. 2011), we affirm.
FILED
AUG 12 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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1. False Arrest and Fourth Amendment Claims
These claims are time-barred.
First, Plaintiff’s notice of his state false arrest claim was filed more than 180
days after the claim accrued and is, therefore, time-barred under the Oregon Tort
Claims Act ("OTCA"). See Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.275(2)(b); Doe 1 v. Lake Oswego
Sch. Dist., 297 P.3d 1287, 1292–93 (Or. 2013) (stating that the limitations period
for an OTCA claim does not begin to run until a "plaintiff has a reasonable
opportunity to discover his injury and the identity of the party responsible for that
injury" (emphasis omitted) (quoting Adams v. Or. State Police, 611 P.2d 1153,
1156 (Or. 1980))); Ross v. City of Eugene, 950 P.2d 372, 375 (Or. Ct. App. 1997)
(describing the elements of the tort of false arrest).
Second, Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim for false arrest, brought under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, was filed more than two years after its accrual and is, therefore,
time-barred. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110(1) (providing a two-year statute of
limitations for personal injury actions); Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007)
(stating that "the accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question of federal
law that is not resolved by reference to state law," and holding that "accrual occurs
when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action, that is, when the
plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief" (internal quotation marks and alteration
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omitted); Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that
§ 1983 claims are governed by the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal
injury actions, and they accrue when the plaintiff knows or should know of the
injury that is the basis of the cause of action).
2. Malicious Prosecution Claims
These claims fail on the merits.
First, there was probable cause to prosecute Plaintiff, and "[p]roof of
probable cause is a complete defense." Gustafson v. Payless Drug Stores Nw.,
Inc., 525 P.2d 118, 119 (Or. 1974); see Ira v. Columbia Food Co., 360 P.2d 622,
625 (Or. 1961) (noting that, even if probable cause exists at the time of arrest, it
may not exist later due to changes in information). Therefore, Plaintiff did not
establish the required elements for a state malicious prosecution claim. See Rose
v. Whitbeck, 562 P.2d 188, 190 (Or. 1977) (listing the elements of an Oregon
malicious prosecution claim).
Second, Plaintiff has not shown "that the defendants prosecuted him for the
purpose of denying him equal protection or another specific constitutional right."
Mills v. City of Covina, 921 F.3d 1161, 1169 (9th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation
marks and alterations omitted). Therefore, Plaintiff also failed to establish the
required elements for a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim. See id. (stating that
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"[f]ederal courts rely on state common law for elements of malicious prosecution"
and that a plaintiff must also show a constitutional violation in order to maintain a
§ 1983 action for malicious prosecution).
3. First and Fourteenth Amendment Claims
We affirm for the reasons given by the district court.
AFFIRMED.
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