Rebecca Alexander, a single woman v. KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON, a county municipality;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
REBECCA ALEXANDER, a single woman,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON, a
county municipality; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 17-35677
D.C. No. 2:17-cv-00653-RSM
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Ricardo S. Martinez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 19, 2019**
Before: SCHROEDER, PAEZ, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Rebecca Alexander appeals from the district court’s orders denying
sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and granting a reduced award of attorney’s fees
under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review for an abuse of discretion. Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 950
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
AUG 27 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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(9th Cir. 2001) (amount of attorney’s fees under § 1447(c)); Barber v. Miller, 146
F.3d 707, 709 (9th Cir. 1998) (sanctions under § 1927). We affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding attorney’s fees
under § 1447(c) in the amount of $3,000 because the record supports the district
court’s calculation under the lodestar method. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Camacho
v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2008) (discussing proper
application of the lodestar method and the district court’s “great deal of discretion”
to determine the reasonableness of the fee (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Alexander’s request
for sanctions because the record does not support a finding of recklessness or bad
faith. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (authorizing an award of attorney’s fees reasonably
incurred because of conduct that “multiplies the proceedings . . . unreasonably and
vexatiously”); Barber, 146 F.3d at 711 (an award of sanctions under § 1927
requires a showing of recklessness or bad faith); Newton v. Thomason, 22 F.3d
1455, 1463 (9th Cir. 1994) (“A district court abuses its discretion . . . when it bases
its decision on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment
of the evidence.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Alexander’s
motions for reconsideration because Alexander failed to demonstrate grounds for

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such relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d
1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (standard of review and grounds for relief under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) or 60(b)).
Alexander’s contention that the district court erred by denying as moot the
motion to dismiss filed by defendants Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems,
Inc., Nationstar Mortgage LLC, and U.S. Bank, N.A. is unpersuasive.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
This case remains administratively closed as to defendant-appellee
Northwest Trustee Services, Inc. See Docket Entry Nos. 37, 40.
AFFIRMED.

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