United States of America v. James A. Pratt

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JAMES A. PRATT,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 17-35887
D.C. No. 1:16-cv-00108-DCN
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
David C. Nye, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 18, 2019**
Before: FARRIS, TASHIMA, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
James A. Pratt appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in
this foreclosure action brought by the United States to enforce liens on Pratt’s
property. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo,
Berezovsky v. Moniz, 869 F.3d 923, 927 (9th Cir. 2017), and we affirm.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
SEP 26 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 17-35887
The district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the United
States because Pratt failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether
the Farm Service Agency owned the debt secured by a deed of trust on Pratt’s
property and whether Pratt was in default on that debt. See Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (“Only disputes over facts that might affect
the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of
summary judgment.”); United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726-729
(1979) (explaining that “federal law governs questions involving the rights of the
United States arising under nationwide federal programs,” but state law provides
the content where a national rule is unnecessary to protect federal interest); U.S.
Bank Nat’l Ass’n N.D. v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 337 P.3d 605, 610 (Idaho 2014)
(Idaho foreclosure requirements for a loan secured by a deed of trust).
The district court judge did not plainly err in declining to recuse himself sua
sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 455 because Pratt failed to demonstrate any grounds for
recusal. See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (listing circumstances requiring recusal); United
States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 911-13 (9th Cir. 2008) (setting forth standard of
review and explaining that § 455 “asks whether a reasonable person perceives a
significant risk that the judge will resolve the case on a basis other than the
merits;” “the reasonable person is not someone who is hypersensitive or unduly
suspicious, but rather is a well-informed, thoughtful observer” (citation and

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3 17-35887
internal quotation marks omitted)).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
All pending motions are denied.
AFFIRMED.

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