GUY ROBERT SODERLIND, Jr., a single individual v. Ursula J. Haigh

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GUY ROBERT SODERLIND, Jr., a single
individual,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
URSULA J. HAIGH,
Defendant,
and
KING COUNTY; JOHN C. HOLLAND,
King County Sheriff’s Deputy,
individually and in his official capacity;
ERIN M. GARSKE, King County
Sheriff’s Deputy, individually and in her
official capacity; MIKE C.
MANSANAREZ, King County Sheriff’s
Deputy, individually and in his official
capacity,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 18-35649
D.C. No. 2:15-cv-01655-RSL
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
FILED
DEC 12 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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Robert S. Lasnik, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted June 5, 2019
Seattle, Washington
Before: RAWLINSON, BEA, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Appellant Guy Robert Soderlind (Soderlind) appeals the district court’s
orders granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees King County (County)
and Deputy John Holland, Deputy Erin Garske, and Deputy Mike Mansanerez of
the King County Sheriff’s Office, and denying Soderlind’s motions for summary
judgment and to amend the judgment.
Soderlind alleged that the officers unlawfully arrested him for violating
anti-harassment orders. However, the district court correctly held that the
investigating officer’s interpretation of the plain language of the anti-harassment
orders was reasonable, thereby establishing probable cause for Soderlind’s arrest.
See Reed v. Lieurance, 863 F.3d 1196, 1204 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining that
“[p]robable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within an officer’s
knowledge are sufficient for a reasonably prudent person to believe that the suspect
has committed a crime”) (citation, alteration, and internal quotation marks
omitted).1
1 Contrary to Soderlind’s assertions, the district court’s interpretation of the
anti-harassment orders did not conflict with its grant of partial summary judgment
(continued...)
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Based on his independent review of the anti-harassment orders, witness
statements, videos, and images, the investigating officer did not “solely rely” on
the neighbors’ complaints, and he properly determined that there was probable
cause to arrest Soderlind. Peng v. Mei Chin Penghu, 335 F.3d 970, 978 (9th Cir.
2003).
The district court appropriately applied the collective knowledge doctrine to
conclude that probable cause existed to arrest Soderlind. See Garcia v. County of
Merced, 639 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that “[w]hen there has been
communication among agents, probable cause can rest upon the investigating
agents’ collective knowledge”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).2
1(...continued)
in favor of the City of Burien. In granting partial summary judgment, the district
court emphasized that “[w]here the precise boundaries of this right-of-way lie, and
whether Mr. Soderlind was within those boundaries when he allegedly walked on
the tideland in front of his neighbors’ homes, [were] questions not before the
Court.”
2 Beier v. City of Lewiston, 354 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2004), relied on by
Soderlind, is inapposite. In that case, neither of the arresting officers read the
restraining order prior to arresting the plaintiff, and they were unable to render a
reasonable probable cause determination because there was “simply no viable
reading of the order pursuant to which [the plaintiff] was in violation.” Id. at 1062-
63, 1068. We also observed that “[a] police officer who does not personally read,
such an order . . . may fulfill his duty by obtaining information from authorized
personnel—such as a supervisor or police dispatcher—who have access to the
terms of the order.” Id. at 1069.
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The district court correctly held that Soderlind was not unlawfully arrested
in the curtilage of his residence because his driveway was exposed to public view
and used for storage and other non-private activities. See United States v. Perea-
Rey, 680 F.3d 1179, 1184 (9th Cir. 2012) (stating that “[w]e examine four
non-exhaustive factors to determine whether an area is part of a home’s curtilage:
the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the area is
included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which
the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from
observation by people passing by”) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
The district court properly denied Soderlind’s motion to amend the
judgment premised on Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663 (2018). In Collins, the
United States Supreme Court held that an officer who saw a parked vehicle
covered by a tarp, “walked onto the residential property and up to the top of the
driveway,” and “pulled off the tarp, revealing a motorcycle that looked like the one
from [a] speeding incident,” entered the curtilage of the residence to conduct the
search. Id. at 1668, 1671. Soderlind’s arrest in his driveway did not occur in a
place with similar privacy features. See id.
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Dismissal of Soderlind’s false arrest, malicious prosecution, and First
Amendment claims was warranted based on the district court’s determination that
the officers had probable cause to arrest Soderlind for violating the anti-harassment
orders, and the officers did not otherwise infringe on Soderlind’s First Amendment
rights.
Because Soderlind failed to demonstrate the requisite constitutional
violations in support of his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the district court
properly entered judgment in favor of the County. See Johnson v. City of Seattle,
474 F.3d 634, 638 (9th Cir. 2007) (clarifying that “municipalities are only liable
under Section 1983 if there is, at minimum, an underlying constitutional tort”)
(citation omitted).
AFFIRMED.
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