Lydia Bultemeyer, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated v. Centurylink Inc.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LYDIA BULTEMEYER, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CENTURYLINK INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 17-15858
D.C. No. 2:14-cv-02530-SPL
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Steven Paul Logan, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 18, 2019**
San Francisco, California
Before: FERNANDEZ, BEA, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Linda Bultemeyer appeals the district court’s judgment dismissing her Fair
Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) claim, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(f), against CenturyLink,
Inc. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse.
FILED
DEC 23 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

-- 1 of 2 --

1. The district court erred in concluding that Bultemeyer failed to allege a
concrete injury sufficient to satisfy Article III’s standing requirement. Section
1681b(f)(1) “protects the consumer’s substantive privacy interest” by prohibiting
third parties from “obtaining a credit report for a purpose not otherwise
authorized.” Nayab v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., 942 F.3d 480, 490 (9th Cir.
2019). Because “every violation of § 1681b(f)(1) ‘offends the interest that the
statute protects,’” a plaintiff “has standing to vindicate her right to privacy under
the FCRA when a third-party obtains her credit report without a purpose
authorized by the statute, regardless whether the credit report is published or
otherwise used by that third-party.” Id. at 490, 493 (quoting Eichenberger v. ESPN,
Inc., 876 F.3d 979, 983–84 (9th Cir. 2017)). Therefore, Bultemeyer’s allegation
that CenturyLink obtained her credit report without the required authorization is
sufficient to confer Article III standing.
2. We decline to exercise our discretion to grant summary judgment to either
party in this case, as “[w]e have repeatedly declined to exercise such discretion . . .
‘where . . . the final order in the case was a dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.’” Gruver v. Lesman Fisheries Inc., 489 F.3d 978, 981 n.4 (9th Cir.
2007) (citation omitted).
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
2

-- 2 of 2 --