Juan Orellana v. RAYMOND MADDEN, Warden

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JUAN ORELLANA,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
RAYMOND MADDEN, Warden,
Respondent-Appellee.
No. 17-56717
D.C. No.
2:16-cv-02316-FMO-FFM
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Fernando M. Olguin, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 12, 2019**
Pasadena, California
Before: BOGGS,*** WARDLAW, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
Juan Orellana is a prisoner in the California penal system serving a term of
15 years to life for convictions of oral copulation with a child and committing a
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Danny J. Boggs, United States Circuit Judge for the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
FILED
DEC 24 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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lewd act on a child. He appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for a writ
of habeas corpus made under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The sole question we must decide
is whether it was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established” United States Supreme Court caselaw for the California Court of
Appeal to conclude that Orellana did not invoke unambiguously his right to have
an attorney present during police interrogation. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). We
hold that the California Court of Appeal did not violate this standard and affirm the
district court in denying Orellana’s habeas petition.
At the outset of the interrogation, Detective Hernandez read Orellana his
Miranda rights. After she read each right to him, Detective Hernandez asked
Orellana if he understood the right; each time Orellana responded, “Yes.” After
Detective Hernandez read Orellana his rights, and after he responded that he
understood his rights, the detective asked Orellana why he had skipped his
appointment with the detective for a voluntary interview. Orellana responded:
“Yes, and then I talked to the attorney ‘cause I had already paid her, and she told
me, ‘You can’t go because first—’ she said . . . .” Detective Hernandez then
interrupted Orellana to tell him “it’s not the attorney’s decision,” and if Orellana
wanted to talk about the case, Detective Hernandez could discuss it with him.
Orellana continued to talk with Detective Hernandez voluntarily and never asked
to speak to his attorney.

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Orellana’s “reference to an attorney . . . [was] ambiguous or equivocal in
that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only
that [he] might be invoking the right to counsel,” not that he necessarily did invoke
his right. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994). Orellana’s answer
referencing an attorney was given in response to a question regarding why
Orellana had skipped the scheduled voluntary interview. The statement was clear
on two facts: (1) Orellana had retained counsel, and (2) Orellana’s counsel told
him not to attend the voluntary interview. No other information was clearly
conveyed in the statement, and the words used did not express an unambiguous
request for the presence of an attorney. Detective Hernandez was not required to
stop the interrogation just because Orellana referenced his attorney; the burden was
on Orellana to “unambiguously request counsel.” Id.
The California Court of Appeal’s decision that Orellana’s Fifth Amendment
rights were not violated when questioning continued because he “had not
unambiguously demanded counsel,” People v. Orellana, No. B255892, 2015 WL
1954474, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2015), applied the correct legal standard
and was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The district court was correct to deny Orellana’s habeas
petition.
AFFIRMED.

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