Melchor Karl T. Limpin v. United States of America

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MELCHOR KARL T. LIMPIN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 19-55369

D.C. No. 3:17-cv-01729-JLS-WVG

MEMORANDUM
*

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Janis L. Sammartino, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 26, 2020
**

Before: McKEOWN, RAWLINSON, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

Melchor Karl T. Limpin appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction his action alleging that he was
wrongfully arrested and detained in connection with removal proceedings. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Ma v. Reno, 114

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED

OCT 30 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

2 19-55369
F.3d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1997), and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Limpin’s action for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction because claims stemming from the decision to arrest and detain
an alien at the commencement of removal proceedings are not within any court’s
jurisdiction. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (“[N]o court shall have jurisdiction to hear
any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action
by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute
removal orders against any alien under this chapter[.]”); Sissoko v. Rocha, 509 F.3d
947, 948-49 (9th Cir. 2007) (where detention arose from decision to commence
removal proceedings, § 1252(g) stripped any court of jurisdiction over Fourth
Amendment false arrest claim); Jimenez-Angeles v. Ashcroft, 291 F.3d 594, 599
(9th Cir. 2002) (“We construe § 1252(g) . . . to include not only a decision . . .
whether to commence, but also when to commence a proceeding[.]”).
We reject as without merit Limpin’s contention that the arrest warrant was
defective because it was not signed by an immigration judge. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a) (“On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested
. . . .”).
AFFIRMED.