United States v. 2020-11-16 | 17-70032 | JULIO NAJERA-MEJIA V. WILLIAM BARR | nonprecedential | memorandum disposition |

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JULIO CESAR NAJERA-MEJIA, AKA
Julio Cesar Almedares,

Petitioner,

v.

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,

Respondent.

No. 17-70032

Agency No. A073-000-124

MEMORANDUM
*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted November 9, 2020
**

Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, TASHIMA and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.

Julio Cesar Najera-Mejia, a native and citizen of Honduras, petitions for
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an
immigration judge’s decision denying his application for withholding of removal
and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED

NOV 16 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

2 17-70032
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual
findings. Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2010). We review de
novo questions of law. Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791-92 (9th Cir.
2005). We deny the petition for review.
As to Najera-Mejia’s political opinion claim, substantial evidence supports
the agency’s determination that a fundamental change in circumstances rebuts the
presumption of a threat to his life or freedom. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1)(A);
see also Tamang, 598 F.3d at 1093 (undisputed facts from petitioner’s own
testimony regarding change of circumstances constituted substantial evidence).
As to Najera-Mejia’s claim related to corrupt police officers, substantial
evidence also supports the agency’s determination that Najera-Mejia failed to
establish past persecution or a clear probability of future persecution in Honduras
based on his family membership. See Tamang, 598 F.3d at 1091, 1094-95
(discussing requirements to establish eligibility for withholding of removal and
finding fear of future persecution was not objectively reasonable).
Thus, Najera-Mejia’s withholding of removal claim fails.
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief because
Najera-Mejia failed to show it is more likely than not he would be tortured by or
with the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to Honduras. See
Aden v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009).

3 17-70032
As stated in the court’s March 20, 2017 order, the temporary stay of removal
remains in place until issuance of the mandate.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.