Juan Thompson v. ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JUAN THOMPSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of
Social Security,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 19-35893

D.C. No. 2:19-cv-00105-RJB

MEMORANDUM
*

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Robert J. Bryan, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted November 16, 2020
**

Seattle, Washington

Before: GOULD and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and BOUGH,
***
District
Judge.

Juan Diangelo Thompson appeals the district court’s affirmance of the

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

***
The Honorable Stephen R. Bough, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Missouri, sitting by designation.
FILED

NOV 19 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his application for disability insurance
benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act and supplemental security income
under Title XVI of the Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42
U.S.C. § 405(g). We review de novo, Attmore v. Colvin, 827 F.3d 872, 875 (9th
Cir. 2016), and we affirm.
The administrative law judge (“ALJ”) was required to provide specific and
legitimate reasons for discounting the opinions of the examining providers. Lester
v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). The ALJ properly evaluated the
longitudinal medical evidence and the medical opinion evidence and provided
specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence to discount the
opinions of the three examining providers, Dr. McDuffee, Dr. Anderson, and Dr.
Harmon. Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 675 (9th Cir. 2017).
The ALJ reasonably concluded that these opinions were inconsistent with
Thompson’s record of improvement when he was compliant with taking his
medication. The ALJ’s conclusion about these inconsistencies was further
supported by her finding that treatment notes contemporaneous to Thompson’s
examination by Dr. Anderson indicate that Thompson’s symptoms—particularly
his difficulty getting along well with others and handling difficult situations—were
well-controlled when he took his medication. Thompson’s argument that he was
compliant during the periods of these three examinations is unavailing because the

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record does not conclusively show he was compliant with taking his medications at
the time of each exam, and the record demonstrated that Thompson had a history
of noncompliance during the relevant time period. Additionally, the ALJ
determined that Thompson was an unreliable witness and an unreliable historian
due to numerous inconsistencies in his testimony and throughout the record, and
Thompson does not dispute this credibility finding on appeal.
The ALJ’s conclusion that the providers’ opinions were inconsistent with
Thompson’s records from individual and group therapy sessions was supported by
substantial evidence. The ALJ recounted that Thompson frequently presented to
sessions with a pleasant, cooperative attitude, euthymic mood, logical thought
processes, intact cognitive function, good eye contact, and numerous other indicia
of mental status findings within a normal range. These findings were in conflict
with the examining providers’ reports of, for example, his tangential thought
processes and aggressive manner. Contrary to Thompson’s assertion, the ALJ
made her findings while also acknowledging the presence of abnormal findings in
the longitudinal record as well, such as times when Thompson presented with
depressed, anxious, or irritable mood. The ALJ is responsible for resolving such
ambiguities in the record, and “[w]e must uphold the ALJ’s decision [even when]
the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation.” Magallanes
v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989).

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Similarly, the ALJ did not err when she concluded that the three examining
opinions were inconsistent with records from Thompson’s group therapy notes,
which revealed that Thompson was cooperative, pleasant, respectful, attentive,
polite, and receptive to others’ comments during sessions, in contrast to the three
examiners’ conclusions that Thompson would be unable to get along with others in
workplace settings. See Turner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 613 F.3d 1217, 1224 (9th
Cir. 2010).
The ALJ’s conclusion that Thompson’s symptoms were in part responsive to
situational stress was also based on substantial evidence. The ALJ detailed
numerous examples between 2012 and 2017 in which Thompson experienced
difficult situations or was noncompliant with treatment, resulting in an impact on
his symptoms. The ALJ’s conclusion that this evidence in the record was
inconsistent with the examiners’ conclusions was specific and legitimate, and
supported by substantial evidence.
The ALJ did not err by giving little weight to the providers’ opinions
because they relied in part on Thompson’s self-reporting, which the ALJ found to
be unreliable due to multiple inconsistencies throughout the record. See id. at
1223. Thompson does not dispute these inconsistencies, nor does he challenge the
ALJ’s finding that he was not a reliable witness or historian of his own symptoms.
Contrary to Thompson’s argument, the ALJ noted that the three opinions relied

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only “in part” on self-reporting, thereby acknowledging that the examining
providers also relied on their own clinical observations and objective testing.
The ALJ’s additional reasons for giving little weight to Dr. Anderson and
Dr. McDuffee’s opinions were also based on substantial evidence. The ALJ
provided a specific and legitimate reason for giving little weight to Dr. McDuffee’s
opinion because Dr. McDuffee’s conclusions contradicted the results of her own
mini-mental status exam. See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir.
2005). The ALJ rejected Dr. Anderson’s opinion for the additional reasons that
Thompson made statements to Dr. Anderson that were inconsistent with his self-
reported psychiatric history elsewhere in the record to which Dr. Anderson did not
have access, and that Thompson presented with far more controlled symptoms at
treatment appointments that were contemporaneous with Dr. Anderson’s exam .
These were specific and legitimate reasons for giving little weight to Dr.
Anderson’s opinion. See Turner, 613 F.3d at 1223.
AFFIRMED.