United States v. 2020-11-20 | 19-56463 | CLIFFORD BRACE, JR. V. STEVEN SPEIER | nonprecedential | memorandum disposition |

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: CLIFFORD ALLEN BRACE, Jr.,

Debtor,
______________________________

CLIFFORD ALLEN BRACE, Jr.,

Appellant,

v.

STEVEN M. SPEIER, Chapter 7 Trustee,

Appellee.

No. 19-56463

D.C. No.
5:19-cv-00290-JGB

MEMORANDUM
*

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Jesus G. Bernal, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted November 18, 2020
**

Before: O’SCANNLAIN, TROTT, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED

NOV 20 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

2
Chapter 7 debtor Clifford Brace appeals the district court’s order affirming
the bankruptcy court’s emergency order requiring turnover of real property to the
Chapter 7 Trustee Steven Speier. The facts are known to the parties, so we repeat
them only as necessary to explain our decision.
I
We need not reach the merits of this case because Brace forfeited his right to
appeal the bankruptcy court’s order due to his absence at the motion hearing.
“[A]ttendance and objection are not prudential standing requirements in
bankruptcy cases, but rather relate to whether a party has waived or forfeited its
right to appeal a given order of the bankruptcy court.” In re Wrightwood Guest
Ranch, LLC, 896 F.3d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 2018).
II
The district court also correctly affirmed on the merits.
A
Undisputed facts in the record show the bankruptcy court did not abuse its
discretion in finding the notice requirements were met. Trustee’s counsel complied
with the telephonic notice requirement and service requirements. L.B.R. 9075-
1(a)(5)–(6). Trustee called, emailed, and mailed Brace, his counsel, and his former
counsel. The bankruptcy court’s finding was not “illogical, implausible, or without
support . . . in the record.” In re Taylor, 599 F.3d 880, 888 (9th Cir. 2010).

3
B
Brace’s challenge to the bankruptcy court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is
meritless. Brace claims that the property at issue is the property of his late mother’s
probate estate. Probate and the administration of a decedent’s estate are typically
reserved to state probate courts. Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 311–12
(2006). But the property at issue here was stipulated to be part of the bankruptcy
estate when the court entered the order approving the settlement agreement. The
probate exception “does not bar federal courts from adjudicating matters . . .
otherwise within federal jurisdiction.” Marshall, 546 U.S. at 296. Further, Brace
had “a fair chance to challenge the Bankruptcy Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction”
when it entered the order approving settlement, so he “cannot challenge it now by
resisting enforcement.” Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 557 U.S. 137, 129 (2009).
C
Brace’s objections to the bankruptcy court’s language contemplating
contempt are unripe. Brace argues that the emergency order is vague as to how he
might purge possible contempt. Even if it were vague, the order stated only that the
court may deem non-compliance to be contempt; it did not find Brace in contempt.
As such, Brace shows no “realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury.” Thomas v.
Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 2000).
AFFIRMED.