United States v. 2020-11-30 | 17-72012 | MIRIAM ROJAS ALVARADO V. WILLIAM BARR | nonprecedential | memorandum disposition |

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MIRIAM BERENICE ROJAS
ALVARADO,
Petitioner,
v.
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 17-72012
Agency No. A203-010-803
MEMORANDUM
*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted November 19, 2020
Phoenix, Arizona
Before: TALLMAN, BYBEE, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Miriam Berenice Rojas Alvarado (Miriam), a native and citizen of
Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision
affirming the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of her application for cancellation of
removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). Because the parties are familiar with the facts,
FILED
NOV 30 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

we will not recite them here. We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision
insofar as it affirms the denial of discretionary relief. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B).
We retain jurisdiction, however, to decide “constitutional claims or questions of
law.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). We deny the petition for review.
“Where, as here, the BIA adopts the IJ’s decision while adding its own
reasons, this court reviews both decisions.” Vahora v. Holder, 641 F.3d 1038,
1042 (9th Cir. 2011). We review adverse credibility determinations for substantial
evidence. Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2010). We will
uphold the Agency’s credibility finding “unless any reasonable adjudicator would
be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Garcia v. Holder, 749 F.3d 785, 789
(9th Cir. 2014) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)).
Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s adverse credibility determination.
Under the REAL ID Act, which applies here, “there is no presumption that an
applicant for relief is credible, and the IJ is authorized to base an adverse
credibility determination on ‘the totality of the circumstances’ and ‘all relevant
factors.’” Ling Huang v. Holder, 744 F.3d 1149, 1152–53 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)). Such factors include “demeanor, candor, or
responsiveness,” as well as inconsistencies between the petitioner’s oral statements
and other evidence of record. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “[I]n evaluating
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inconsistencies, the relevant circumstances that an IJ should consider include the
petitioner’s explanation for a perceived inconsistency . . . and other record
evidence that sheds light on whether there is in fact an inconsistency at all.”
Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1044 (citation omitted).
Here, the IJ based his conclusion on a number of inconsistencies between
Miriam’s testimony at her individual hearing and other record evidence. Of note,
Miriam testified that she did not know there was marijuana in her vehicle
notwithstanding her earlier guilty plea that she “knew that hidden in the vehicle
there was a quantity of marijuana.” Far from ignoring the record evidence, then,
the IJ reasonably concluded that the inconsistency between Miriam’s guilty plea
and her testimony undermined her credibility. The record thus does not compel a
contrary conclusion with respect to the adverse credibility determination.
PETITION DENIED.
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