United States v. 2020-12-10 | 19-35141 | GEOFFREY LAWSON V. DAN PACHOLKE | nonprecedential | memorandum disposition |

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GEOFFREY ROBERT LAWSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DAN PACHOLKE; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 19-35141

D.C. No. 2:16-cv-00361-SMJ

MEMORANDUM
*

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Washington
Salvador Mendoza, Jr., District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 2, 2020
**

Before: WALLACE, CLIFTON, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.

Geoffrey Robert Lawson appeals pro se from the district court’s order
dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging access-to-court claims. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir.

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED

DEC 10 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2010). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record, Thompson v. Paul,
547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008), and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Lawson’s access-to-court claims
already raised or which could have been raised in his prior action as barred by the
doctrine of res judicata. See Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d
708, 713 (9th Cir. 2001) (setting forth elements of res judicata).
Lawson’s remaining access-to-court claims were properly dismissed because
Lawson failed to allege facts sufficient to show he was injured by defendants’
actions. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349-53 (1996) (elements of an access-
to-courts claim and actual injury requirement); see also Christopher v. Harbury,
536 U.S. 403, 417 (2002) (to plead an actual injury, the complaint “should state the
underlying claim in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a),[ ] just
as if it were being independently pursued”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Lawson’s
complaint without leave to amend because amendment would have been futile.
See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir.
2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave
to amend is proper when amendment would be futile); Chodos v. West Publ’g Co.,
292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that a district court’s discretion to
deny leave to amend is “particularly broad” when it has previously granted leave to

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amend).
Lawson’s challenges to the denial of his motions for a preliminary injunction
are moot. See Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan, 954 F.2d 1441, 1449-50 (9th
Cir. 1992) (when underlying claims have been decided, the reversal of a denial of a
preliminary injunction would have no practical consequences, and the issue is
therefore moot).
We reject as meritless Lawson’s argument that the district court should not
have granted defendants’ motion to amend their answer. See S. Cal. Edison Co. v.
Lynch, 307 F.3d 794, 807 (9th Cir. 2002) (“District courts have ‘inherent power’ to
control their dockets.” (citation omitted)).
All pending motions are denied.
AFFIRMED.