United States v. 2020-12-14 | 19-35733 | ROD STUCKER V. STATE OF IDAHO | nonprecedential | memorandum disposition |

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ROD STUCKER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

STATE OF IDAHO; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 19-35733

D.C. No. 1:19-cv-00007-DCN

MEMORANDUM
*

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
David C. Nye, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 2, 2020
**

Before: WALLACE, CLIFTON, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.

Rod Stucker appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his
action alleging federal and state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We review de novo a district court’s determination of whether the
complaint failed to comply with the notice pleading requirements of Federal Rule

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED

DEC 14 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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of Civil Procedure 8. Pickern v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.), Inc., 457 F.3d 963, 968 (9th
Cir. 2006). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Stucker’s action for failure to comply
with Rule 8 because, despite an opportunity to amend, Stucker’s operative second
amended complaint was prolix, confusing, and failed to allege clearly the bases for
his claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (a pleading must contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”); Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (Rule 8 requires the complaint “give
the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests” (alteration in original, citation and internal quotation marks omitted));
McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-78 (9th Cir. 1996) (a complaint that is
“argumentative, prolix, replete with redundancy, and largely irrelevant” does not
comply with Rule 8; if “one cannot determine from the complaint who is being
sued, and for what relief, and on what theory” then the complaint violates Rule 8).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying further leave to
amend because amendment would have been futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide
Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of
review and explaining that leave to amend may be denied when amendment would
be futile); Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1072 (9th
Cir. 2008) (explaining that “the district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is

3 19-35733
particularly broad where plaintiff has previously amended the complaint” (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Stucker’s motion to
disqualify the district judge because Stucker failed to establish any ground for
disqualification. See United States v. McTiernan, 695 F.3d 882, 891-92 (9th Cir.
2012) (setting forth standard of review and circumstances requiring
disqualification).
We do not consider as outside the scope of this appeal Stucker’s contentions
that Chief Judge Thomas improperly dismissed Stucker’s judicial misconduct
complaint against the district judge.
Stucker’s motion to disqualify the district judge and motion to transmit
physical exhibit are denied.
AFFIRMED.