United States v. 2020-12-15 | 19-56359 | WLADIMER KLIMENKO V. ROSENDO GONZALEZ | nonprecedential | memorandum disposition |

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WLADIMER JOHN KLIMENKO,

Appellant,

v.

ROSENDO GONZALEZ, Chapter 7
Trustee,

Appellee.

No. 19-56359

D.C. No. 2:18-cv-09873-SJO

MEMORANDUM
*

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
S. James Otero, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 2, 2020
**

Before: WALLACE, CLIFTON, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.

Chapter 7 debtor Wladimer John Klimenko appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment affirming the bankruptcy court’s order denying Klimenko’s
motion to set aside the default judgment in an adversary proceeding against him.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We review de novo the

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED

DEC 15 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

2 19-56359
bankruptcy court’s conclusions of law and for clear error its findings of fact.
Decker v. Tramiel (In re JTS Corp.), 617 F.3d 1102, 1109 (9th Cir. 2010). We
affirm.
The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by denying Klimenko’s
motion to set aside the default judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b)(1) because Klimenko failed to demonstrate any basis for such relief. See
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9024 (making Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) applicable to bankruptcy
cases); United States v. Aguilar, 782 F.3d 1101, 1105-07 (9th Cir. 2015) (setting
forth standard of review and discussing factors to consider when a party seeks
relief from a default judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)); see also 11 U.S.C.
§ 727(a) (2005) (setting forth the rule for denial of discharge).
AFFIRMED.