James Schlienz v. RICHARD PRATT, Interim Division Director of Health Services at Arizona Department of Corrections

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAMES SCHLIENZ,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

RICHARD PRATT, Interim Division
Director of Health Services at Arizona
Department of Corrections,

Defendant-Appellee,

and

CHARLES L. RYAN, Director, Arizona
Department of Corrections; et al.,

Defendants.

No. 20-15755

D.C. No. 3:19-cv-08071-MTL-
CDB

MEMORANDUM
*

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Michael T. Liburdi, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 2, 2020
**

Before: WALLACE, CLIFTON, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED

DEC 15 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

2 20-15755
Arizona state prisoner James Schlienz appeals pro se from the district court’s
judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to
his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review de novo the district court’s dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Resnick v.
Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Schlienz’s action because Schlienz
failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Flores v. County of
Los Angeles, 758 F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 2014) (to state a failure-to-train claim,
a plaintiff must show that the official “was deliberately indifferent to the need to
train subordinates”); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011)
(supervisory liability under § 1983 requires “knowledge of and acquiescence in
unconstitutional conduct” by subordinates); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42
(9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are construed liberally, a plaintiff must
present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the third
amended complaint without leave to amend because further amendment would
have been futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034,
1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that dismissal
without leave to amend is proper when amendment would be futile).
We do not consider claims from Schlienz’s earlier complaints that were

3 20-15755
dismissed with leave to amend because Schlienz failed to replead them in his
operative complaint. See Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 911 (9th Cir.
2012) (en banc) (claims dismissed with leave to amend are waived if not repled).
Schlienz’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Docket Entry No. 6) is
denied as unnecessary. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3).
All other pending motions and requests are denied.
AFFIRMED.