Melissa L. Hatfield v. ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA L. HATFIELD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 19-16970
D.C. No. 2:18-cv-02842-SPL
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Steven Paul Logan, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 1, 2021**
Phoenix, Arizona
Before: W. FLETCHER, MILLER, and HUNSAKER, Circuit Judges.
Melissa Hatfield appeals from the district court’s order reversing an
administrative law judge’s denial of her application for disability insurance
benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act and remanding her case to the
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
FEB 4 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Social Security Administration for further proceedings. The only issue on appeal is
whether the district court abused its discretion in remanding for further
proceedings instead of directing payment of benefits. See Harman v. Apfel, 211
F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2000). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and
we affirm.
Only in rare circumstances does a case merit a remand for an award of
benefits instead of further proceedings. Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 886–87
(9th Cir. 2004). A remand for an award of benefits is appropriate only if the record
is fully developed and there are no outstanding issues to resolve. Treichler v.
Commissioner of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1101 (9th Cir. 2014). Here,
gaps and inconsistencies in the record exist, leaving some doubt as to whether
Hatfield is disabled under the terms of the Social Security Act. See Leon v.
Berryhill, 880 F.3d 1041, 1047–48 (9th Cir. 2017). The district court therefore did
not err in refusing to direct an award of benefits.
The record is not fully developed as to whether Hatfield can type. Hatfield
testified that she could not perform a sedentary office job because her childhood
epilepsy had created a disconnect between her eyes and her hands, preventing her
from typing on a computer. But no evidence in the record beyond Hatfield’s
testimony substantiates her claim that she cannot type. Because typing is an
essential skill for many jobs in the national economy, additional evidence

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demonstrating that Hatfield cannot type may be critical to resolving this case.
The record is also not fully developed as to Hatfield’s memory loss. At her
hearing, Hatfield testified that she had recently developed “severe problems with
memory,” but the only psychiatric evaluation of her memory in the record occurred
more than two years before the date of the hearing. While that evaluation found
that Hatfield had no problems with her memory, a more recent evaluation will
further develop the record and may provide more accurate information about
Hatfield’s memory.
There are also inconsistencies between Hatfield’s testimony and Dr.
Edelstein’s opinion. Hatfield testified that she could sit for extended periods as
long as she could reposition herself every 15 minutes. But Dr. Edelstein opined
that Hatfield could sit for only 10 minutes at a time and a maximum of three hours
in an eight-hour workday. While “the pressures of a workplace environment” could
exacerbate Hatfield’s condition, Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1016 (9th Cir.
2014), it is not apparent from the existing record that workplace stresses can
explain such an inconsistency, especially in light of Hatfield’s testimony that she
can drive (presumably seated) for 30 minutes if cruise control is on. These
inconsistencies leave open the question of whether Hatfield can sit through an
eight-hour workday. See Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 496 (9th Cir.
2015).

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The vocational expert testified that, assuming Hatfield could not perform
more than light work, she would not be able to find employment if her ailments
rendered her incapable of typing, caused her to be off task for more than 10 percent
of the workday, prevented her from sitting through a workday, or forced her to take
more than four days off a month. The gaps and inconsistencies in the record are
relevant to a determination of the severity of Hatfield’s medical condition.
Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that further
proceedings were necessary. See Dominguez v. Colvin, 808 F.3d 403, 410 (9th Cir.
2015).
AFFIRMED.

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