Ana Francisca Linares-Miranda v. ROBERT M. WILKINSON, Acting Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ANA FRANCISCA LINARES-MIRANDA,
Petitioner,
v.
ROBERT M. WILKINSON, Acting
Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 15-71127
Agency No. A095-810-208
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted February 16, 2021**
Before: GRABER, FRIEDLAND, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.
Ana Francisca Linares-Miranda, a native and citizen of El Salvador,
petitions pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order
denying her motion to reopen removal proceedings. Our jurisdiction is governed
by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
FEB 19 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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reopen. Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010). We deny in part
and dismiss in part the petition for review.
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Linares-Miranda’s untimely
motion to reopen where Linares-Miranda failed to support her motion with an
affidavit or other evidentiary material and otherwise failed to establish changed
country conditions in El Salvador to qualify for an exception to the time limitations
for filing a motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to reopen
proceedings shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if
the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary
material.”); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 986 (“The BIA can deny a motion to reopen
on any one of ‘at least’ three independent grounds – ‘failure to establish a prima
facie case for the relief sought, failure to introduce previously unavailable, material
evidence, and a determination that even if these requirements were satisfied, the
movant would not be entitled to the discretionary grant of relief which he sought.’”
(citation omitted)). We do not address Linares-Miranda’s contentions regarding
whether she established prima facie eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal,
or relief under the Convention Against Torture because the BIA did not reach that
issue. See Santiago-Rodriguez v. Holder, 657 F.3d 820, 829 (9th Cir. 2011) (“In
reviewing the decision of the BIA, we consider only the grounds relied upon by
that agency.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

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Linares-Miranda does not challenge in her opening brief the BIA’s denial of
her request to reopen pursuant to its sua sponte authority. See Lopez-Vasquez v.
Holder, 706 F.3d 1072, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2013) (issues not specifically raised and
argued in a party’s opening brief are waived). Linares-Miranda also does not
challenge the BIA’s denial of her request for administrative closure. Id. Thus,
these issues are waived.
We lack jurisdiction to consider Linares-Miranda’s contentions regarding
ineffective assistance of counsel because she failed to raise them to the BIA. See
Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677-78 (9th Cir. 2004) (court lacks jurisdiction
to review claims not presented to the agency); see also Ontiveros-Lopez v. INS,
213 F.3d 1121, 1124 (9th Cir. 2000) (requiring a petitioner who argues ineffective
assistance of counsel to exhaust administrative remedies by first presenting the
issue to the BIA).
Finally, the government’s motion to strike the reply brief in part (Docket
Entry No. 27) is denied as unnecessary.
As stated in the court’s July 17, 2015 order, the temporary stay of removal
remains in place until issuance of the mandate.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.

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