VICTOR REYES, Jr. v. K. Marino, 17930;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
VICTOR REYES, Jr.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
K. MARINO, 17930; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
CITY OF GLENDALE POLICE
DEPARTMENT; et al.,
Defendants.
No. 19-17341
D.C. No. 2:19-cv-01440-JJT-JFM
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
John Joseph Tuchi, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 17, 2021**
Before: FERNANDEZ, BYBEE, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
Victor Reyes, Jr. appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
FEB 23 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law claims arising
out of his arrest. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A for failure to state a claim. Wilhelm v.
Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2012). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Reyes’s action because Reyes failed to
allege facts sufficient to state a plausible federal claim. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627
F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed,
a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim); see also Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 535 (1984) (deprivation of property does not violate
due process if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy is available, which includes
state law remedies); Tatum v. City & County of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090,
1095 (9th Cir. 2006) (when analyzing a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim,
the “initial inquiry is whether the officers’ actions [were] objectively reasonable in
light of the facts and circumstances confronting them” (alteration in original,
citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Cabrera v. City of Huntington
Park, 159 F.3d 374, 380 (9th Cir. 1998) (to prevail on a false arrest claim, the
plaintiff must show there was no probable cause to arrest him; where a
determination that there was no probable cause would “necessarily imply” the
invalidity of the plaintiff’s conviction, a false arrest claim is barred by Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

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The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Reyes’s state law claims. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)(3); Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 826 (9th Cir. 2001) (court may decline
supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims once it has dismissed all
claims over which it has original jurisdiction).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.

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