Estate of William Han Manstrom-Greening, through Carol J. Manstrom, Personal… v. Lane County;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ESTATE OF WILLIAM HAN
MANSTROM-GREENING, through Carol
J. Manstrom, Personal Representative,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
LANE COUNTY; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 20-35072
D.C. No. 6:18-cv-00530-MC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Michael J. McShane, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 5, 2021
Portland, Oregon
Before: BOGGS,** PAEZ, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
Carol Manstrom brings this action in her capacity as the personal
representative of the Estate of her son, William Han Manstrom-Greening. The
Estate alleges the following claims: (1) a state-law negligence claim against Glenn
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The Honorable Danny J. Boggs, United States Circuit Judge for the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
FILED
MAR 18 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Greening, William’s father; (2) a Fourteenth Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against Greening in his capacity as a state actor; and (3) a Fourteenth
Amendment claim under § 1983 against Lane County, Lane County Parole and
Probation, and Donovan Dumire, the Manager of Parole and Probation. The Estate
appeals from the district court’s order granting summary judgment to defendants.
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
1. The district court erred in granting summary judgment to Greening on the
state-law negligence claim. Under Oregon negligence law, an actor is negligent if
he “ought reasonably to foresee that he will expose another to an unreasonable risk
of harm.” Stewart v. Jefferson Plywood Co., 469 P.2d 783, 786 (Or. 1970). The
concept of foreseeability “refers to generalized risks of the type of incidents and
injuries that occurred rather than predictability of the actual sequence of events.”
Fazzolari v. Portland Sch. Dist. No. 1J, 734 P.2d 1326, 1338 (Or. 1987). Here, the
generalized risk of harm resulting from Greening’s act of leaving a loaded gun on a
desk in the living room is that someone else living in the home could harm
themselves or another with the gun, either intentionally or accidentally.
Unfortunately, that is exactly what happened when William used Greening’s gun
to take his own life. A reasonable jury could find that William’s suicide was
within the realm of foreseeable risks resulting from Greening’s act of leaving his

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loaded gun readily accessible and unsecured. See Piazza v. Kellim, 377 P.3d 492,
512–13 (Or. 2016).
2. The district court properly granted summary judgment to defendants on
the Fourteenth Amendment claims. The state-created danger doctrine holds state
actors liable for violating a person’s substantive due process right to bodily
integrity when the state actors “affirmatively and with deliberate indifference
placed that person in danger.” Pauluk v. Savage, 836 F.3d 1117, 1122 (9th Cir.
2016). Here, the record does not show that Greening acted with deliberate
indifference to a known or obvious danger. See Patel v. Kent Sch. Dist., 648 F.3d
965, 974 (9th Cir. 2011). No rational jury could find that Greening knew about
William’s suicidal ideation and nevertheless chose to leave a loaded gun
accessible. Thus, there is no showing that Greening recognized the risk that
William might take his own life and intended to expose William to that risk. See
Hernandez v. City of San Jose, 897 F.3d 1125, 1135 (9th Cir. 2018). Because there
is no showing of deliberate indifference, we need not reach the issue of whether
Greening acted affirmatively or under color of state law.
Without an underlying constitutional violation by Greening, we also need
not address whether Dumire and the County defendants ratified Greening’s
conduct. See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127–28 (1988); Trevino
v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1996).

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AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part; CASE REMANDED.
The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

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