Donald Keith Chapman v. JEFERY ALVEREZ, Dept. Supervisor (Doctor);

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DONALD KEITH CHAPMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JEFERY ALVEREZ, Dept. Supervisor
(Doctor); et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 19-17170
D.C. No. 2:18-cv-03317-DJH-JFM
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Diane J. Humetewa, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 16, 2021**
Before: GRABER, R. NELSON, and HUNSAKER, Circuit Judges.
Arizona state prisoner Donald Keith Chapman appeals pro se from the
district court’s judgment dismissing as a discovery sanction his 42 U.S.C. § 1983
action alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion a
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAR 22 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 3 --

2 19-17170
dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37. Ingenco Holdings, LLC
v. Ace Am. Ins Co., 921 F.3d 803, 821 (9th Cir. 2019). We reverse and remand.
The district court denied Chapman’s timely request for an extension of time
to file an opposition to defendants’ motion to dismiss because it found Chapman
was acting in bad faith. However, Chapman stated he needed an extension of time
to obtain documentation from prison officials regarding the reason he failed to
attend his deposition, and about one week after the district court denied the
extension, he did obtain and file an information report and incident report from
August 1, 2019, the date of the deposition in question, showing that Chapman was
taken to the infirmary around the time of the deposition. See Ahanchian v. Xenon
Pictures, Inc., 624 F.3d 1253, 1259 (9th Cir. 2010) (requests for extensions of time
made before the applicable deadline has passed should generally be granted in the
absence of bad faith or prejudice to adverse party; good cause for an extension of
time under Rule 6(b) is a “non-rigorous standard” that is construed broadly).
Because the district court’s finding of bad faith is not supported by the
record, it abused its discretion in denying Chapman’s request for an extension of
time, striking Chapman’s opposition to defendants’ motion to dismiss, and
dismissing the action under Rule 37. We reverse and remand for further
proceedings.
Chapman’s motions for sanctions (Docket Entry Nos. 16, 20, and 33) are

-- 2 of 3 --

3 19-17170
denied. Chapman’s motion for clarification (Docket Entry No. 32) is denied as
moot.
REVERSED and REMANDED.

-- 3 of 3 --