David Anthony Jackson v. Brian Cates

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DAVID ANTHONY JACKSON,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
BRIAN CATES*,
Respondent-Appellee.
No. 19-55141
D.C. No.
5:12-cv-01293-PSG-MRW
MEMORANDUM**
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Philip S. Gutierrez, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 1, 2021
Pasadena, California
Before: SILER,*** HURWITZ, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges.
David Anthony Jackson appeals the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. Jackson alleges that his un-Mirandized statements to the police should
* Brian Cates is substituted for his predecessor, D. Long, as Acting
Warden. Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).
** This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
*** The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, United States Circuit Judge for the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
FILED
APR 21 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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have been suppressed, and also that his later Mirandized statements should have
been suppressed under the rule of Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004). We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a), and we affirm.
We review de novo a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480, 484 (9th Cir. 2000). Under AEDPA, Jackson must
show that the state court’s decision: (1) was “contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established” federal law, as determined by
U.S. Supreme Court precedents; or (2) was based on “an unreasonable
determination of the facts.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). We review “the last reasoned
state court decision to address the claim[s].” White v. Ryan, 895 F.3d 641, 665
(9th Cir. 2018). Here, the last reasoned decision was by the California Court of
Appeal.
1. After several rounds of interrogations over a 30-hour period, Jackson
confessed to the murder of his girlfriend’s toddler, Jayanna. Jackson was later
convicted of second-degree murder and assault on a child resulting in death and
sentenced to 25 years to life in prison. Jackson’s claim is and has been simple:
under the totality of the circumstances, law enforcement had him “in custody,” and
thus should have advised him of his Miranda rights before they began asking
questions. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S 436, 478–79 (1966). Because Jackson

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was not advised of his rights until after he made the challenged statements, he
claims his confessions should be suppressed.
The California Court of Appeal disagreed, reasoning that Jackson was not in
custody before receiving Miranda warnings because: (1) he was told he was not
under arrest; (2) the interview room door was left open during many breaks; (3) he
was offered refreshments, cigarettes, and bathroom breaks; (4) he never expressly
asked to leave; and (5) he was never told that he had to explain what happened
before he could leave. The court also rejected Jackson’s Seibert argument because
the “break in the interview followed by the Miranda advisement[] signified a
change in the interrogation,” rendering any post-warning statements admissible.
Finally, the Court of Appeal found that any introduction of his statements was
harmless error.
2. Applying AEDPA deference, we find that the Court of Appeal did not
unreasonably determine that the admission of Jackson’s statements was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); see
also Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257, 269 (2015) (“When a Chapman decision is
reviewed under AEDPA, a federal court may not award habeas relief under § 2254
unless the harmlessness determination itself was unreasonable.” (cleaned up)). The
state court reasonably found the other evidence against Jackson “damning.” Jayanna
was alive and healthy when her mother left the apartment. Jackson was then “alone

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with Jayanna for an hour, during which time neighbors heard crying, a voice saying,
‘shut up,’ and a loud thump.” Jayanna was found shortly thereafter with a fractured
skull and “extensive injury to the abdomen internally”; those “injuries were caused
by blunt force trauma.” Given the evidence that Jackson shouted “shut up”
immediately before a “loud thump was heard” and the evidence concerning the
severe nature of Jayanna’s injuries, we cannot say that the state court’s decision on
harmlessness was “obviously wrong.” Shinn v. Kayer, 141 S. Ct. 517, 523 (2020).
We therefore affirm.
AFFIRMED.

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