Bradley R. Blansette v. CITY OF SCOTTSDALE, DBA Scottsdale Housing Agency

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRADLEY R. BLANSETTE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CITY OF SCOTTSDALE, DBA Scottsdale
Housing Agency,
Defendant-Appellee,
and
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND
URBAN DEVELOPMENT,
Defendant.
No. 19-16220
D.C. No. 2:17-cv-02878-DWL
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Dominic Lanza, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 20, 2021**
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, TASHIMA and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
APR 27 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Bradley R. Blansette appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
judgment in his action alleging violations under the Americans with Disabilities
Act (“ADA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo.
Stephens v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 935 F.3d 852, 854 (9th Cir. 2019). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Blansette
failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he is a qualified
individual with a disability or was discriminated against by the defendant by
reason of disability. See Cohen v. City of Culver City, 754 F.3d 690, 695 (9th Cir.
2014) (setting forth elements of an ADA Title II claim); Weinreich v. L.A. Cnty.
Metro. Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 1997) (no ADA violation where
plaintiff’s exclusion from program was based on plaintiff’s failure to provide
updated certification of a qualifying disability, and not the fact or perception that
plaintiff had a disability).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Blansette’s motion
for sanctions because Blansette failed to establish grounds for sanctions. See
Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 1118, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2002) (standard of
review and grounds for sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11); Fink v. Gomez, 239
F.3d 989, 991-94 (9th Cir. 2001) (grounds for sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927
and the court’s inherent power).
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

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appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.

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