United States of America v. JAY CHRISTOPHER DEAN MATT, Jr.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JAY CHRISTOPHER DEAN MATT, Jr.,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 20-30114
D.C. No. 2:19-cr-00267-BLW-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
B. Lynn Winmill, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 18, 2021**
Before: CANBY, FRIEDLAND, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.
Jay Christopher Dean Matt, Jr., appeals from the district court’s judgment
and challenges the 46-month sentence and one condition of supervised release
imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for witness tampering, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1512(b). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAY 27 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Matt contends that the sentence is substantively unreasonable in light of his
mitigating evidence. The district court did not abuse its discretion. See Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The above-Guidelines sentence is
substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors and
the totality of the circumstances, including the nature of the offense and Matt’s
criminal history. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51; see also United States v. Gutierrez-
Sanchez, 587 F.3d 904, 908 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The weight to be given the various
factors in a particular case is for the discretion of the district court.”).
Matt also contends that the imposition of special condition of supervised
release number 2, which authorizes warrantless, suspicionless searches of Matt and
any residence, property, or automobile under his control, was procedurally
erroneous and infringes on his fundamental rights. Contrary to the government’s
argument, this claim is not barred by the appeal waiver in the plea agreement,
which provided that Matt could file “one direct appeal” if the district court varied
upward from the Guidelines range, as it did here. However, we conclude that the
court did not plainly err in imposing the condition. See United States v. LaCoste,
821 F.3d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 2016).1 This court has held that a warrantless search
1 We decline to exercise our discretion to review this claim de novo. See United
States v. Gonzalez-Aparicio, 663 F.3d 419, 426-27 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that
decision whether to refrain from applying plain error standard of review is
discretionary and declining to exercise its discretion to disregard plain error
standard).

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condition does not violate the Fourth Amendment, see United States v. Betts, 511
F.3d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 2007), and Matt does not cite any authority requiring the
district court to support such a condition with an individualized assessment, see
Gonzalez-Aparicio, 663 F.3d at 428 (for an error to be plain, it must be clear or
obvious under existing precedent). Moreover, the district court’s reasons for
imposing the condition are apparent from the record, which reflects Matt’s long
history of substance addiction and his willingness to use subterfuge to hide his
criminal activity. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d); United States v. Cervantes, 859 F.3d
1175, 1184 (9th Cir. 2017).
AFFIRMED.

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