Barry Louis Lamon v. KATHLEEN ALLISON, Warden;

20-16284Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitJul 29, 2021

Full text

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BARRY LOUIS LAMON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
KATHLEEN ALLISON, Warden; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 20-16284
D.C. No. 2:18-cv-02218-TLN-CKD
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Troy L. Nunley, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 19, 2021**
Before: SCHROEDER, SILVERMAN, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Barry Louis Lamon appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging various claims. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion a
district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JUL 29 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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follow the district court’s orders regarding Rule 8. McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d
1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996). We affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Lamon’s action
without prejudice for failure to comply with Rule 8 because, despite two
opportunities to amend, Lamon’s second amended complaint was prolix,
confusing, and failed to allege clearly the bases for his claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2) (requiring that a pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”); McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1177-78 (no
abuse of discretion in dismissing a complaint for violation of Rule 8 because the
complaint was prolix, confusing, and contained irrelevant material).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Lamon’s motion
for reconsideration because Lamon failed to demonstrate any basis for relief. See
Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63
(9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for relief under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 or 60).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Lamon’s motion
for a preliminary injunction because Lamon failed to identify the relief sought in
his motion. See Jackson v. City & County of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 958
(9th Cir. 2014) (setting forth standard of review and requirements for a preliminary
injunction). We lack jurisdiction over Lamon’s appeal of the denial of his motion

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for a temporary restraining order. See Religious Tech. Ctr., Church of Scientology
Int’l, Inc. v. Scott, 869 F.2d 1306, 1308 (9th Cir. 1989) (denial of a temporary
restraining order is appealable only if the denial is tantamount to the denial of a
preliminary injunction).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Lamon’s motion
for appointment of counsel because Lamon failed to demonstrate exceptional
circumstances. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting
forth standard of review and “exceptional circumstances” requirement for
appointment of counsel).
Lamon’s motion to appoint counsel (Docket Entry No. 4) is denied.
AFFIRMED.

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