Arnoldo Camacho-Vasquez v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ARNOLDO CAMACHO-VASQUEZ,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 20-71877
Agency No. A079-803-978
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted July 28, 2021**
San Francisco, California
Before: McKEOWN and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges, and HUCK,*** District Judge.
Arnoldo Camacho-Vasquez seeks review of an Immigration Judge’s (IJ)
decision affirming an asylum officer’s negative reasonable fear determination in
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Paul C. Huck, United States District Judge for the U.S.
District Court for Southern Florida, sitting by designation.
FILED
JUL 30 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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reinstatement proceedings. We review due process challenges de novo and deny
the petition. Zuniga v. Barr, 946 F.3d 464, 466 (2019)(per curiam).
Camacho-Vasquez argues that the IJ denied him due process by conducting
the reasonable fear review without his counsel present and without first obtaining a
proper waiver of the right to counsel. Even assuming there is a right to counsel at
this particular type of proceeding, there is no due process violation here because
Camacho-Vasquez waived any right to counsel by answering in the affirmative
when asked whether he wanted to proceed by himself. Tawadrus v. Ashcroft, 364
F.3d 1099, 1105 (9th Cir. 2004) (“In order for a waiver to be valid, an IJ must
generally: (1) inquire specifically as to whether petitioner wishes to continue
without a lawyer; and (2) receive a knowing and voluntary affirmative response.”
(citations omitted)). Despite Camacho-Vasquez’s urging, Castro-O’Ryan v. INS,
847 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1988), is not to the contrary. There, we relied not just on
the colloquy but also on the IJ’s denial of the petitioner’s specific request for a
change of venue to secure an attorney. Id. at 1311, 1313. Here there was no
similar request. Camacho-Vasquez’s counsel asserts that Camacho-Vasquez may
have been unaware that counsel was not present at the hearing and that Camacho-
Vasquez was diagnosed with depression which rendered his waiver unknowing.
However, the record does not indicate whether Camacho-Vasquez thought his
counsel was present, and there is no evidence that Camacho-Vasquez’s depression

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prevented him from entering a knowing and voluntary waiver.
Camacho-Vasquez also argues that the delay in receiving a reasonable fear
determination by an asylum officer violated his due process rights. But Camacho-
Vasquez does not assert any prejudice from the delay, and therefore he cannot
prevail on this claim. See Grigoryan v. Barr, 959 F.3d 1233, 1240 (9th Cir.
2020).1
PETITION DENIED.
1 The motion for a stay of removal, Dkt. No. 1, is denied as moot.

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